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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
A fair amount of work on examining factors that influence ending 
stocks has already been completed. Farmer- owned reserve stocks have been 
found to influence the level of commercial carryover . Another fac t or, 
not previously considered at length, is stocks carried over under the 
nonrecourse loan program, also know as the nine-month loan program. This 
study specifically examines these subsidized portions of ending stocks, 
and in so doing develops an approach for endogenizing government loan 
activity in the inventory equation of a U.S . corn supply and demand 
model. Loan outlays have been a large component of program costs in 
recent years . A more thorough understanding of fac tors influencing l oan 
activity is usefu l in predicting effects policy changes have on 
expendi tures for the government ' s loan programs and on the level of 
government and commercial carryover. 
In the first part of this chapter , the basic provisions of the 
government's loan programs are discussed . The remaining portion presents 
the pr oblem sta t ement, the objectives of this analysis , and a literature 
review. 
Loan Programs 
Since 1933, the CCC (Commodity Credit Corporation) has offered the 
nine-month loan program to producers . The basic program has since been 
modified, but its operation and purpose of supporting prices has not 
changed. 
Farmers participate by presenting their grain as collateral when 
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they obtain CCC loans. A farmer can redeem his l oan at anytime prior to 
the end of the nine-months without penalty . All he must do is repay t he 
l oan plus the incurred interest. Farmers who haven 't ye t redeemed t heir 
loans at the end of the nine months when the l oan expires, can either 
repay the loan plus interest or forfeit the stored grain to the CCC . If 
they choose to default on the loan and forfeit the grain , the CCC has "no 
recourse" but to accept the grain held as collate r al as r epayment for the 
loan. 
The nine- month program accomplishes the f ollowing objectives. The 
CCC helps t o support prices by providing incentives for producers t o 
withhold grain from the market. Because they can default on the loans 
without penalty, the CCC is in a sense acting as a n unlimited source of 
demand , which helps maintain depressed prices from falling farther. By 
allowing producers to redeem loans on demand, they can take advantage of 
their speculative activity if prices rise, but the released g ra i n keeps 
prices from rising t oo high. Producer s are not only exposed t o l ess 
risk through the default and redemption mechanisms, but they are also 
being subsidized with h i gher than collIIllercial loan rates and lower than 
commercial interest rates on their loans. 
If the nine- month loan r a t e i s continually above the mar ket clearing 
price, the program can lead t o l a r ge i ncreases in CCC owned stock. The 
s t ock build up can be expensive t o the gover nment . In some years the CCC 
employs a s upply side mechanism to assis t the loan progr am in supporting 
prices by making participation in a set-aside or land diversion a 
prerequisite for participation in the loan pr ogram . 
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Legislation from the 1977 Food and Agriculture Act set up the 
farmer-owned reserve program, which provides another storage alternative 
to the farmers. This loan program is more restrictive and its purpose is 
to support and stabilize prices by removing grain from the market for a 
longer time. 
To participate, the farmer signs a contract with t he government to 
store grain for three years or until the market price reaches a preset 
release price. The participating farmer receives a loan plus storage 
payments, with the stored grain again acting as collateral. The reserve 
loan rate is usually higher than the nine-month loan rate. If the market 
price surpasses the release price, the Secretary of Agriculture is 
authorized to increase the interest rate on the loans and design other 
methods, such as halting storage payments, to induce farmers to redeem 
their loans and market the grain. 
Original legislation from the 1977 Act specified the release as a 
fixed percentage of the reserve loan rate, but now it is determined by 
the Secretary. A call price was also originally specified as a 
percentage of the loan rate, but higher than the release. Producers were 
obligated to repay their reserve loans, unearned storage payments, and 
any interest charges during call status . They were not required to 
market their grain, but often had to in order to repay their loans. 
Currently, however, call status is reached only if the Secretary 
determines an emergency justifies such action. 
The data in Table 1 . 1 show the composition of U. S. corn stocks by 
category, including the subsidized farmer-owned reserve and nine- month 
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loan categories. It is clear that carryover under loan varies 
substantially from year to year . 
Table 1.1. Total price support loans and end year private and 
government stocks of cor n 1965/66-1982/83 (mil . bu.) 
Private Stocks 
Fr ee 
Oct . / Total Farmer Govt . Total 
Sept . Loans Under Loan? Total Owned Owned Ending 
Year Made Yes No Reserve Stocks Stocks 
65/66 214.9 347.9 245.2 593 .l 0 248 . 6 841. 7 
66/67 263.0 234.5 454.0 688.5 0 137 . 8 826 . 3 
67/68 466 . 8 533 . 2 453.2 986.4 0 182.3 1168 . 7 
68/69 403.4 442.l 381.2 823 . 3 0 295.1 1118 . 4 
69/70 398 . 0 346.2 404.1 750 . 3 0 254.9 1005 . 2 
70/71 323.3 237 . 6 324.1 561.7 0 105.0 666 . 7 
71/72 954.5 563.7 403.l 966 . 8 0 160.l 1126. 9 
72/73 419.8 89.8 539.0 628 . 8 0 79.l 707.9 
73/74 260.6 5 . 3 471.3 476.6 0 7 . 3 483.9 
74/75 76.8 3.1 358.0 361.1 0 0 . 3 361.4 
75/76 147 .0 23.4 376.2 399 . 6 0 0 .1 399 . 7 
76/77 274 . 8 148.2 737 . 7 885 . 9 0 o.o 885 . 9 
77 /78 1159 . 0 415.3 367.5 782.8 315.5 13 . 1 1111.4 
78/79 641.0 115. 7 538 .6 654 . 3 549 . 9 99 . 7 1303 . 9 
79/80 558 . 0 82.6 642.2 724 . 8 636 . 4 256 . 3 1617 . 5 
80/81 838 . 0 100.8 510 . 0 610 . 8 185.4 237 . 8 1034 . 0 
81/82 1968.6 299 . l 262 .9 562 . 0 1310.0 302 . 4 2174 . 0 
82/83 1576.3 109.8 293 . 2 403.0 1550.0 1166.0 3119.0 
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The portion of carryover held under nine-month loan is generally 
considered part of free commer cial stocks. Free stocks a re not very 
isolated from the market, because they can be used or sold at anytime ; 
there are no restrictions placed upon them. This analysis, however, 
considers stocks carried over under the nine-month loan separately from 
the other free stocks. Free stocks under loan and those not under loan 
are different in that g rain held in the nine-mont h loan program is held 
at a lower cost to the farmer compared with other private storage. 
The reserve program, unlike the nine-month l oan program, has 
provisions that discourage farmers ·from r edeeming their loans on demand . 
These provisions make the reserve stocks far mo re isolated from the 
market. However, reserve storage is more heavily subsidized through 
direct storage payments and higher loan rates. 
Problem Statement 
One of the objectives of the government's loan programs is to 
stabilize the market price at a higher level than what would otherwise 
result. In trying to achieve this objective, program expenditures have 
been unpredictable and, especially in recent year s, costly . 
A web of interactions among government reserves, private carr yover, 
future price expectations , and current price all influence the size and 
extent of participation in the loan pr ograms and hence the size of the 
expenditures t o finance them. Figure 1.1 illustrates some of these 
relations hips . A step toward solving the problem of uncertainty and 
unpredictability with respect t o financing the loan programs could be 
achieved with a better understanding of these relationships. 
SUPPLV 
-
COSTS 
$$$ 
~,-,-- ~ ,- MARKET PR I CE ___ IC'--- I 
1 a nd deman mong s upp Y · ns a 1 Inte r actio Figure 1 . . d comp one n 
DEMAt~D USES 
-FOOD 
-FEEil 
-SEED 
-E~PORTS 
d marke t t s a n Pr i ce 
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Obj ec t ives 
The objectives for carrying out this study are: 
1) To develop an econometric model that endogenizes the effects 
of the government ' s subsidized storage programs. 
2) To examine the interr elationships that exist between 
government subsidized stocks and private stocks. 
3) To examine the effects changes in loan program provisions have 
on the size of the subsidized stocks . 
4) To examine how government costs vary with changes in these 
provisions. 
This r esearch should have merit in t hat it will further the knowledge 
available on the int e r dependence between government owned and subsidized 
stocks and nonsubsidized producer stocks, and how this interdependence 
influences the cost and effectiveness of the stock programs . 
Li terature Review 
This section briefly reviews some of the relevant research done on 
modeling government loans and the effects gove rnment reserves have on 
private stock carryover. 
Miller, Meyers , and Lancaster (1978) developed a theoretical and 
empirical framework for analyzing the demand for corn and wheat CCC 
loans . They specified loan demand in their models to be a function of a 
ratio of the CCC loan rate and market price , a ratio of CCC and 
Production Credit Association interest rates, a risk variable, 
pr oduction, and a variable t o reflect program compliance . The models 
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showed s trong loan rate/market price ratio effects. 
Go l den and Burman (1979) use a quarterly model t o evaluate CCC loan 
activity for corn and wheat . They specified loan demand as a function of 
discounted future price, a price volatility variable , a loan rate/price 
ratio , production , and seasonal dummy variables. 
Meyers, Jolly , and Smyth (1983a) examine farmer- owned reserve 
placements and develop a model for estimating parameters based on ea rlier 
theoretical work (Meyers and Jolly , 1980). Their mon thly model specified 
placements as a f unction of quantities available for reserve placement, 
the marke t price , and a variable that reflects the present value of a 
bushel of grain pl aced in the reserve . The present value computation 
combined most of t he program and market factors that pr oducers would 
consider before joining the reserve program, e . g ., loan r ate , interest 
rate, storage payment, number of months interest is charged on t he loan , 
storage cost, expec t ed price, and discount rate . The present value 
variable was very significant in the model. 
Baumes and Womack (1979) examine two structures for supply and 
demand models in t he agricultural sector ; one a stock adjustment mode l 
and the ot her a price adjustment model in which there is no specified 
ending stock equa tion . In their analysis , one of the things they 
examined was how the level of government stocks affected ending commer-
cial stock levels for corn. They found a negative relationship between 
the two with a coefficient of - 0 . 25 for government s t ocks . 
Shar pl es and Holland (1981) analyzed the wheat farmer-owned reserve 
impact on private stocks. Their results imply that the wheat farmer-
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owned reserve acted as an additional demand for wheat . They also 
hypothesize that wheat stocks accumulated in the reserve may be a partial 
substitute for private stocks . 
Peck (1977 ) examined how CCC stock levels affect private inventories 
for wheat . She found that larger levels of government stocks have a 
negative influence on private stocks . She says that the more abundant 
supplies are, in an accessible position , even if held by the government, 
the less the value a producer places on carrying his own stock privately. 
Hence, she hypothesized, government stocks may substitute for private 
stocks. 
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL PRESENTATION OF MODEL 
Graphical Presentation 
Figure 2.1 shows a graphical illustration of the U.S . Corn Model. 
Total demand in diagram (f) is the sum of private s t ock demand, 
government stock demand, export demand, food demand, and feed demand. 
Seed demand is rather small a nd is omitted fr om the graphical analysis. 
Private stocks, in diagram ( a ), include the demand for subsidized 
reserves, which are held privately. The kink in the demand cur ve 
illustrates how the subsidized storage programs tend t o cause an increase 
in total private stock demand. The quantity demanded a t the market price 
increases to Q
2 
from Q
1
• Free private stock demand, however, may 
decline. 
Total supply, as it is shown in (f), is independent of current 
price, therefore is perf ectly ine lastic. Tot al demand, DT-T- R- DG, is 
kinked to reflect the effects of the government's subsidized storage 
programs; the result of which is a higher market price. The perfectly 
elastic portion of total demand curve, R-DG, reflects the CCC's role as a 
source of unlimited demand whenever the marke t price ends up being below 
the loan rate for the nine-month loan pr ogr am or when price is below t he 
entry pr i ce f or the reserve. Producers can turn the grain ove r t o the 
CCC at the end of the required s t or age time fo r eac h pr ogram . 
The market price that r esults from the intersection of the total 
supply and demand curves is one facto r that influences the next period's 
suppl y decision , made via acreage pl anted . Expected s upply is shown in 
diagram (g) . 
p 
(a) 
p 
(b) 
\ - - - 1 ----
1 t 
I : \ 
I I \ 
I I 
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p 
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Figure 2 .1. Gr aphical r ep r esen t a tion of U. S . corn model 
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Mathematical Presentation 
The purpose of the simple mathematical model presented here is to 
provide additional theoretical underpinnings for the empirical analysis. 
The mathematical model will demonstrate the effects of selected exogenous 
shifts on key endogenous variables. The model is as follows: 
(2.1) Dt = a - bl Pt + ul 1 
(2.2) STKt = a - b2Pt + c2QPt - d R - e2QPt+l - £2CCCt + u2 2 2 t 
(2.3) Rt a -3 b3Pt 
+ c3Zt + U3 
(2.4) QPt+l a4 + b4P t + U4 
(2.5) QPt + STI\-1 + Rt-1 + ccct-l Dt + STKt + Rt + ccct 
where b1 , b2 , b3 , c3 , b4 > O; 0 < c2 , d2, f 2 < l; e 2 > l; 
CCCt = ending CCC stocks , 
CCCt_1= beginning CCC stocks , 
Dt current period utilization, 
Pt equilibrium price, 
QPt =current crop year production, 
QPt+l production for next crop year, 
Rt = ending stocks for government subsidized reserves, 
Rt-l = beginning subsidized stocks, 
STKt = ending private stocks, 
STKt_1= beginning private stocks, 
zt = loan program polic y variable. 
The constant terms represent separate effects of other exogenous 
variables . For simplicity, the error terms are omitted from the remainder 
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of the analysis . 
Equation (2.1) represents demand utiliza t ion a nd is a function of 
various exogenous factors (a
1
) and the equilibrium price. Demand is 
inver sely related to price . 
Equation (2.2) is the private ending stock equation . Private stocks 
a r e a func tion of price, pr oduction, government owned stocks, government 
subsidized stocks, expected production , and o ther exogenous fac t or s . Fo r 
simplicity, both the stocks in the farmer-owned reserve and nine-month 
l oan programs are included in R • Subsidized reserves , expected 
t 
production , and government owned stocks all negatively affec t the level 
of ending stocks through an expected price effect. Also, it is expected 
that a high current price will reduce private inventories and a high 
current production l evel will increase private invent ories . 
The level of carryove r in the reserve a nd under nine- month loan is 
expressed in Equation (2 . 3) and i s a function of price, government 
policy provisions , and o ther exogenous facto r s . Price is expected to be 
inversely related t o levels of subsidi zed carryover . The gove r nment 
policy va riable (Z t ) is defined in such a way t hat it is positively 
rela t ed t o R ; any change that induces more par tic ipa tion r a i ses R . 
t t 
For example, a policy change tha t raises the loan rate f or government 
loans would expectedly induce more par t icipation in the loan pr ogr ams , 
hence r aising the subsidized s t ock l evel . 
Expec ted production in Equation (2 . 4) is a function of the ma rket 
price and other exogenous factors . Price is positively related to 
expected pr oduc tion . 
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The market clearing condition is expressed in Equation (2.5). 
Production and beginning stocks are detennined by last period's price . 
To better understand the behaviorial relationships and interactions 
of this model , comparat ive statics analysis is performed. Several 
reduced form impacts are derived. The reduced forms for price, 
subsidized stocks, private s tocks, and expected production are sho1o111 in 
Equations (2.6), (2 . 7), (2.8), and (2 .9), respectively . The derivations 
are presented in Appendix A. 
(2.6) 
(2. 7) 
(2.8) STK 
t 
a0 - a1QPt + °iz t + ~ccct- y0 
s 
b a b a. 
- _1___Q_ + ~p = a3 S S ~ t 
- b3a2 ) z 
s t 
b a. b y -~cc+; o p t ..... 
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(2.9) QPt+l 
b a 
b a - ~Pt a4 + 4 0 i::s ' 
where 
a 
0 = al + a2 + a3(1-d2) - e2a4 
a. 1 a. < 0 = c - 1 1 2 
a. c3 (1-d2 ) 
a. > 0 2 2 
a. = 1 - f a.3 > 0 3 2 
y 0 = STK t - 1 + Rt- 1 + ccct-1 Yo > 0 
j3 = b1 + b2 + e 2b4 + b3 (1 - d2) j3 > 0 
A discussion of the implied reduced form impacts on price, 
subsidized reserves, private stocks, and expected production resulting 
from loan program policy variation follows. It is assumed all other 
variables are being held cons t ant . These theoretical results help 
anticipate the outcome of the policy analysis in Chapter S. 
(2.10) 
A change in loan policy to induce more participation has a positive 
effect on the market price as shown in (2.10). As more grain is placed 
under loan, less is available for sale on the market, causing price to 
move upward. 
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(2. 11) 
oRt bfl2 
o, since - -= C3 --- > o z 13 t 
b3a. 2 c3b3(1 - d2 ) > 0 C3 ---= c -
13 3 bl + b2 + e2b4 + b3( 1-d2 ) 
The result from the i mpac t in (2.11) shows that the policy variable 
is defined as being positively related to the level of subsidized 
reserves. Making the programs more attractive t o producers by , say, 
raising the loan rate or lowering the i nteres t rate will increase the 
expected returns from subsidized storage, causing that quantity stored t o 
increase. 
(2.12) 
oSTKt 
oz 
t 
The impac t in (2 . 12) , however, shows the negative effect the loan 
policies can have on private s t ocks . This may result f r om producers 
viewing the government ' s programs as an a l terna tive to private s t orage 
and/or the producers may be considering what the effect on expected price 
will be. If they foresee a large build- up in reser ves re sulting from an 
attractive loan progr am , their price expectations may be lowered as a 
result. The potential ·fo r the grain to be released in some later period 
affects expected price. 
(2.13) 
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The result f r om the impact on expected produc tion in (2 . 13) impl i es 
an inter esting situation. If an a ttractive loan program draws heavy 
participa tion, there will be a posi tive effect on next period ' s 
production. This means that if the government wishes t o have existing 
supplies shrink, it should also include som~ t ype of acreage reduc tion 
program for the l oan pr ogr am participants. 
18 
CHAPTER 3. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The model used in this analysis can be divided into two major parts . 
The first is a national corn model with estimated equations and 
identities for solving domes tic consumption, export demand, ending 
stocks, and acreage response. The second part calculates government 
costs with respect to the l oan programs. The cost portion of the model 
is solved r ecursively from the simultaneous solution of the national 
model. 
The national model is similar to the Baumes and Meyers corn model 
(1980) except for the ending stock equation. In this model ending stocks 
are specified in such a way as to endogenize the nine- month and far mer-
owned reserve loan programs within the simulation . 
This chapter presents the specification for the behaviorial 
equations and the identities. These are shown in Tabl e 3.1 and the 
variable definitions are in Appendix B. The following sections explain 
how the independent elements in the estimated equations are expected to 
be r elated to the dependent variable and how the identities are 
calcul ated . The expected signs are given above the the elements in the 
specified equations . 
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Table 3.1. Struc ture of the U. S. corn modela 
Production 
(3 . 1) CORPGRl = CORSAl * .86 * CORSYGRl 
(+) (+) (+) (-) 
(3.2) CORSAl = f 1(CORNRE/SNRE1, CORPEl/SOYPF, CORSA, CORPDl/CORPF) 
(3.3) CORNRE = (CORPF * (CORSYGR1_1 + CORSYGR1_2 + CORSYGR1_3)/3) - CORVC 
(3.4) 
Feed demand 
(-) (+) 
CORDF = f 2(CORPF/FPINDEX , SOMPM/FPINDEX, (+) (+) (+) 
GCAUTST, LIVIFl, CORDF_1) 
Food demand 
(-) (+) 
(3.5) CORDH = f 3(CORPF/WHEIW1, CENl) 
Export Demand 
(-) (+) (-) 
(+) 
WHEPF/FPINDEX, 
(3.6) CORXTOT = f 4(CORSOYEU, LIVPEUJl, COR9SRF, SHIFT72, SHIFT79) 
(3.7) CORSOYEU (CORECPC * CORPA + (1- CORECPC) * 
(39.368 * CORPF/SDROCT))/(SOMPM/SDROCT) 
(3.8) CORECPC = (COSMNE9/39 . 368)/CORXTOT 
(3 . 9) CORMX CORXTOT - ((CORMXCC-CORMESR)/39.368) + CORMXSPR + CORMG 
Ending Stocks 
(-) 
(3.10) CORHCCIX = f
5
(CORPF/WHEIW1, 
(-) (+) 
CORPGRl, CORPGR, 
(3.11) CORHPRRE = CPLACE - CUMRED 
(-) 
(CORHPRRE + CORHHUN), 
(-) (-) 
NRL, IPCA) 
a 
See Appendix B for variable definitions . 
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Table 3.1 . (continued) 
(- ) (+) (+) (-) ( - ) (+) (+) (+) 
(3 . 12) CPLACE = f
6
(CORPF , CORRE, PRES, ICCC, TBILL , CORPGR , CPART, SPMT) 
(3 .13 ) NRL CORTPSL - CORPRES - CORNTRED - CORFCCC + EXTCARRY 
(+) ( - ) (+) (+) (+) 
(3 . 14) CORTPSL = f
7 
(CPRATW, ICCC/IPCA , CRISK , CORPGR, CPART, WAIVE81 , RSHIFT) 
(3.15) CPRATW 
(3 .16) z 
(3 . 17) CRISK 
(Z(CORPL) + (1- Z)CORRE)/CORPF 
(CORTPSL - (CPLACE - CPLACE_1))/CORTPSL 
2 
1/3 ~ (CORPFt-i- (CORPF + CORPF_1 + CORPF_2)/3)2 
i=O 
(3.18) CORPRES CPLACE - CPLACE_1 - CYRED 
(+) (-) (-) (+ ) 
(3 . 19) CORNTRED = f 8 (CORPN}fL, CORPL/CORPF,ICCC/IPCA,CORPGRl) 
(3 . 20 ) CORPNML = CORTPSL - (COREXTL + CORPRES) 
Market clearing ident ity 
(3.21) CORDH + CORHT + CORMX + CORDS = CORPGR + CORHT_1 + CORMI 
Government loan ou tlays 
(3 . 22 ) NMLOAN CORPL * (CORTPSL - (CPLACE - CPLACE_1)) 
( 3. 23) NMRED = CORPL * (CORTPSL - (CPLACE - CPLACE_1) - NRL - CORFCCC 
(3 . 24) NETNM NMLOAN - NMRED 
(3. 25) FORLOAN = CORRE * (CPLACE - CPLACE_
1
) 
(3 . 26 ) FORRED 
(3.27) NETFOR 
(3 . 28) TSPMT 
((CORRE + CORRE_1 + CORRE _2)/3) * (CUMRED - CUMRED_1) 
FORLOAN - FORRED 
SPMT*((CORHPRRE+cORHPRRE_1 )/2 + (CORlIBUN+cORHHUN_1) /2) 
(3.29) DEFPAY = CORSA*CPART*lOO*(CORPT- MAX(CORPL , CORPF- . 10)) 
(3.30) NETCOST = NETNM + NETFOR + TSPMT + DEFPAY 
21 
Production 
Equation (3.1) is the identity for calculating expected production 
(CORPGRl), which is equal to expected corn acreage planted (CORSAl) 
times the expected yield (CORSYGRl) adjusted by a harvesting rate, a 
constant 0.86. 
Corn acreage planted in the next period is estimated with the 
acreage response function specified in Equation (3.2). The first term 
in this equation is a corn to soybean net returns per acre ratio 
(CORNRE/SNREl). The calculation for corn net returns per acre is shown 
in Equation (3.3). The expected sign for this ratio is positive, since 
producers will be more inclined to devote acres to corn if the net 
returns from doing so are greater. On the other hand, higher net 
returns per acre from soybeans will tend to decrease corn acreage 
planted, since soybeans act as a substitute for corn. 
The sign on the expected effective support price for the corn to 
soybean price ratio (CORPEl/SOYPF) is positive; higher corn support 
prices induce producers to plant corn, while higher soybean prices 
induce producer s t o plant less corn and more soybeans. There is an 
effective support price f or soybeans, but it is not used in this 
equation. The soybean price has been above the support price throughout 
most of the historical period, as a result, producers may mainly 
consider the soybean price itself and not the effective support price 
when they make their planting decisions . 
Current acreage planted (CORSA) represents the time lag involved in 
increasing or decreasing corn acres planted. Corn production is time 
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consuming and costly; it is not usual that producers can immediately 
increase or reduce acreage . Therefore, a positive sign is expected for 
this variable. 
The expected diversion payment is one important policy variable 
used to regulate supply. Any increase in this ratio (CORPDl/CORPF) is 
expected to decrease corn acreage planted. 
Fe ed Demand 
Feed demand is shown in Equation (3 . 4) and is inversely related to 
the market price (CORPF). Higher prices make it more expensive for 
producers to use corn as feed, and they may even substitute soybean meal 
(SO}!PM) or wheat (WHEPF) instead. 
Grain consuming animal units (GCAUTST) and the livestock price 
index (LIVIFl) are positively related to corn feed demand. Larger 
livestock numbers create more total feed use, including feed from corn. 
Higher livestock prices shift out feed demand as producers increase their 
herd sizes . 
Lagged feed demand (CORDF_
1
) reflects the time and expense facing 
producers who wish to change their herd sizes . Due to the relatively 
fixed sizes of their yards and confinements, producers are restricted 
from changing the sizes of their operations, and hence their feed use, 
immediately. As a result, the expected sign for lagged feed demand is 
positive . 
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Food Dem.and 
Equation (3 . 5) is the specification for food use . Food use i s 
inversely related t o the price . Personal consumption expenditures on 
nondurable goods and services (CENl) act as a proxy for the amount 
consumers spend on food pr oduced f r om corn. I f these expenditur es 
increase, we assume cor n food demand will inc rease also . 
Export Demand 
Total U. S. exports for corn a r e calcula t ed fr om the iden tity in 
Equation (3 .9 ) and are derived from a world export demand equation 
(CORXTOT) shown in (3.6). CORXTOT r eflects the t o t al world export demand 
facing major exporters and is s pecified simil arly t o t he model developed 
by Westhoff and Meyers (1984). 
The corn/soymeal price ratio (CORSOYEU) in Equation (3 . 6) reflects 
the substitutability between corn and soymeal. Equations (3 . 7) a nd 
(3 . 8) show how t h is r a tio i s calculated . The U. S. corn and soymeal 
prices a re deflated by the s t andar d dr awing r a t e which is used t o adjust 
prices for changes in exchange r ates . The expected sign on CORSOYEU is 
negative . 
The livestock index variable (LIVPEUJl) in (3 . 6) r eflects the EEC 
and Japanese hog a nd poultry production. Lar ger production of these 
commodities will s hift export demand outward. 
Competing s upplies in the major cor n impor ting countries i s 
measured by EEC corn supply and Japanese rice fed t o livestock 
(COR9SRF) . This va r iable is expected t o be negatively related t o export 
demand . 
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SHIFT72 and SHI FT79 are dummy variables used to account for 
unexplained shif ts in expor ts in 1972 and 1979 , 1980 . 
Knd~ng Stock Demand 
Equation (3.10) shows the specification for ending commercial 
stocks. CORHCCl X represents f ree stocks excluding t hose held under 
government loan. Most ending stock models include nine- month carryover 
as part of the dependent variable. The specification used here, 
however, gives clearer indications a s to how the gover nment sponsored 
l oan programs affect producers' priva t e storage decisions. 
The first term in Equation (3.10) is the real price for corn 
(CORPF/WHEIWl) and equals the corn price r eceived by farmers divided by 
the wholesale price index . A negative expected sign for price indica t es 
producers' desires t o market cor n instead of holding it when prices are 
rising. 
The sum of reserve a nd CCC stocks (CORHPRRE + CORHHUN) and nine-
month l oan carryover (NRL) act as proxies for the expected price next 
crop year. Relatively large reserve, CCC, and nine- month stocks 
i nfluence expected price through their potential to be r eleased on the 
the marke t. The expected price effect fo r outstanding nine-month loans 
is probably larger since these stocks are not isolated from the market . 
However , reserve and CCC stocks are more isolated due t o restrictions 
placed on their r e lease and storage tha t the impact on next period's 
expec t ed price may be less, but may last l onger , especially if these 
stock quantities a r e l a r ge. 
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Expected pr oduction (CORPGRl) can affect e nding stocks no t only 
through expected price but also through producers ' precautionary mo tive 
for holding inventory . Fo r instance , if the r e a r e forecast s fo r a good 
crop next period , producers may maintain l ower inventories since they 
will be able to replenish them through an abundant harvest. 
The Production Credit Association's interes t rate ( IPCA) in Equation 
(3 . 10) reflec ts the gene r al market interest rate and acts as a measure of 
opportunity cost . If this rate increases, producers would be mo re 
inclined t o sell corn and invest the cash from sales a t t he highe r 
interest rate . 
Current produc t ion (CORPGR) influences ending stocks through the 
market price and is positively related to the level of ending stocks . 
Equation (3 . 11) is the identity used t o solve fo r reserve ending 
stocks. Cumulative reserve placements (CPLACE) less cumulative reserve 
redemptions (CU}1RED) yield the r e serve s t ock level at the period ' s end . 
Cumulative placements are specified in Equation (3 . 12) . This 
equation r eflec ts both marke t a nd program influences on r eserve stocks. 
Price received (CORPF) is a market influence a nd is expected t o 
negatively influence placements in the rese rve . Another market influence 
is the thr ee- yea r treasury bill r a te (TBILL) which reflec ts the long term 
general interest rate and acts as a measure of opportunity cost . If this 
rate increases, potential reserve pa rt icipants would be l ess inclined to 
place corn in t he reserve . Instead, they would a lterna tively sell the 
grain a nd invest the cash r eceipts a t the higher interest r ate reflected 
by TBILL . 
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Current production (CORPGR) in (3.12) has a positive expec t ed sign , 
because large levels of production may drive down the market price, 
inducing more r eserve placement. 
The remaining elements of (3 .1 2) reflect program influences on 
cumulative placements. The reserve entry price (CORRE) is the reserve 
loan rate. Higher loan r ates tend t o induce mo re participation in t he 
program by increasing producers' expected returns from storage. The 
release price (PRES) is a predetermined price at which grain f r om the 
reserve is allowed t o be redeemed without penalty only after it is 
reached by the market price . At this point direct storage subsidies 
cease. Higher release prices would expectedly inc rease reserve 
placements. The CCC interest rate (ICCC) is the interest cha r ged on 
reserve loans . A higher rate means tha t the interest expens e to 
participants will be greate r, which acts a s a disincentive t o reserve 
participation . Storage payments (SPMT) are a direct subsidy paid t o 
reserve participants to s t or e their gr a in . Curr ently set at 
$.265/bushel, this payment, if raised, will induce more placements . 
Equation (3.13) i s the carryover held under nine- month l oan (NRL) 
identity . The l as t term in this equation, extended carr yover 
(EXTCARRY), i nclude s gr ain tha t was placed in the ol d reseal program 
f r om 1953 through 1971. This pr ogram was s imilar to the r eserve i n that 
it a llowed producers t o keep gr ain under loan after their nine- month 
loans expi r ed . They we re given the option of extending t heir loans with 
the CCC paying the s t or age costs . The majo r difference from the 
reserve progr am, however, was tha t corn pl aced unde r extended loan was 
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redeemable on demand, whereas loans under reserve are not. Extended 
carryover in (3 .13) becomes 0 after 1971 when the resale program was 
terminated. 
The other exogenous variable in Equation (3 . 13) is forfeitures to 
the CCC (CORFCCC). Forfeitures are deliveries to the CCC that result 
when producers default on their nine- month loans. 
Total price support loans (CORTPSL) issued during the period in 
(3.13) are specified in the behavioral Equation (3 . 14). This equation 
is modeled following the method of Miller et al. (1978). The loan/price 
ratio (CPRATW) takes into account the different loans rate for the 
reserve and nine-month loan programs. Its computation is shown in 
(3.15) and (3 .16). The way this ratio is computed implies corn is 
placed either under nine-month loan or reserve loan, when it can 
actually move from the nine-month progr am into the reserve. 
Nevertheless, this variable does capture producers ' concerns for each 
pr ogram's loan rate. Prices received by producers (CORPF) in this ratio 
reflect the loan rates of private financial institutions like the PCA, 
since they lend at a rate proportional to the value of the collateral. 
One expects a positive sign for this ratio because, for example, as CCC 
loan rates increase more producers would be inclined to acquire CCC 
loans; their returns from storage would be greater. 
The interest rate ratio (ICCC/IPCA) in Equation (3.14) reflects 
producer concerns for the program interest rates verses private financial 
institutional interest rates. The expected sign is negative because the 
interest expense will induce potential borrowers to borrow from the 
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lenders with a lower rate . 
The risk variable (CRISK) is a three yea r moving variance of the 
market price . Its computation is shown in Equation (3.17). An expected 
positive sign for risk reflects the notion that producers see the CCC as 
an assumer of risk. 
Current production (CORPGR) in (3.14) affects total loan demand 
through a price effect. Larger production levels place downward 
pressure on price , inducing producers to place more corn under price 
support loans. 
CPART represents the proportion of producers who are eligible for 
CCC l oans. In some years , only farmers participating in land set-asides 
are eligible . 
The last elements in (3 . 14) are dummy variables. WAIVE81 reflects 
the unusually large number of loans issued in 1981. That was the year 
interest was waived on reserve loans. The purpose of the interest 
waiver was to induce more participation in the reserve in order t o 
remove excess g rain from the market that resulted from the Carter 
administration's grain embar go . RSHIFT reflects the shift in the level 
of CCC loan demand since the beginning of the reserve program in 1977 . 
Equation (3.18) shows how to calculate re serve placements during 
the crop year (CORPRES) . It is the difference between current and 
lagged cumulative placements less a ny reserve crop year r e demptions . 
CORPRES is used in (3.13) to solve for nine- month loans outstanding . 
Nine- month loan redemptions (CORNTRED) are specified in Equation 
(3 . 19). The e lement CORPNML r ef l ects the amount of nine- month loans 
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available for redemption and is simply the diffe r ence between the 
quantity of corn placed under total price support and reserve 
placements during the year . A functional form which is approp r iate for 
estimating nine-month redemption~ is a logistic function shown below: 
(3 . 31) CORNTRED = CORP~lML/l+exp [-(a+f3Xi)] 
where CORNTRED approaches CORPfilfi. in the limit as (a +i3X.) increases . 
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The sign for the loan/price ratio (CORPL/CORPF) in Equation (3 . 19) 
is expected to be negative because higher relative loan rates mean 
producers must repay more to the CCC when the loan is redeemed . On the 
other hand, higher rela tive corn prices would tend to increase loan 
redemptions . 
The interest ratio (ICCC/IPCA) in Equation (3 . 19) is expected to be 
negative because higher relative CCC interest rates mean larger loan 
repayments to the CCC upon redemption. In this equation , too , the PCA 
interest rate reflects the gene r al market interes t rate and acts as a 
measure of opportunity cost. 
Expected production (CORPGRl) in Equation (3.19) proxies expected 
price. For instance, if expected production for next year is large , the 
fu ture price would expectedly be less than if fu ture pr oduction were 
small . Producer s will be more inclined to redeem their loans now 
. rather than carry them into the next period and receive a lower price . 
Equation (3.21) shows the market clearing identity , and the 
calculations for government outlays associated with the loan programs are 
shown in Equations (3 . 22) through (3.30). 
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CHAPTER 4 . EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND VALIDATION 
This chapter presents the results of the estimation and simulation 
pr ocedures . The first section presents the calculated coefficients for 
the cumulative pl acement equation and a description of the technique 
used to calculate them . The second section presents the results from the 
simultaneous estimation of the other parameters and an analysis of the 
entire model thr ough a dynamic simulation . 
Computation of the Cmml.ative Placement Coefficients 
The specification for farmer- owned reserve cumulative 
placements, which was first shown in the last chapter, is listed below: 
(4 . 1) CPLACE = f 1(CORPF , CORRE, PRES , ICCC , TBILL , CORPGR , CPART, SPHT) 
This annual placement function includes most of the ma j or market and 
policy facto r s that affect producers' placement decisions . 
A special technique, independent of the rest of the model, must be 
employed to estimate the coefficients for this equation. Because the reserve 
has been in operation only since 1977 , there are not enough annual 
observations for a regression analysis. There are , however, enough 
monthly observations to permit an analysis using a mont hly model. The 
coefficients for the annual placement equation listed above are derived 
from the simulation of a monthly reserve placement model during "direct 
entry" years only (1979, 1981, 1982) . Once the coefficients for the 
annual placement equation are derived, we then place it back into the 
complete U. S. corn model to be used in the estimation of the other 
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parameters and the simulation analysis . For the years 1977, 1978, and 
1980, the exogenous values for cumulative placements are used. 
The monthly model used in this technique was initially developed by 
Meyers and Jolly (1980) and further developed by Heyers , Jolly, and Smyth 
(1983a,b). In the development and use of their model they assume 1) 
that farmers rationally compare the expected returns and benefits from 
reserve participation t o the expected r e turns from alternative uses of 
the grain, 2) there is a cash price as the alternative to which reserve 
participation is compared, and 3) there is a maximum quan~ity of grain 
available for placement. 
What follows is a brief description of the Meyers ·et al. (1983b) 
placement model. The general specification for monthly reserve 
placements is shown below: 
where the t subscripts represent mo nthly periods and where 
MKT 
PART 
market price for corn, 
participation rate for the acreage reduction programs , 
PPV = present value from storage , 
QAP = quantity of corn available for placement, 
QP quantity placed into the reserve. 
The market price is inversely related t o monthly placements . The 
present value variable is a summary variable that includes most of the 
policy and market facto r s that affect the present value from reserve 
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storage. Any policy or market factor that increases expected returns 
from reserve storage increases placements. Larger quantities available 
for placement and/or larger participation will also increase placements. 
Meyers et al. (1983b) chose a logistic function as the f orm to 
estimate the monthly coefficients. Equations (4.3) through (4.8) show 
the structure of their model and the estimated coefficien ts they 
obtained are given in (4.3). 
(4.3) PLACEt 
1 + exp[-(-7.75 - l.95(CORPFt) + 3.74(PPVMAXt) - l . 30(PARTt)] 
(4.4) AVAILt = (HARVt-SLDt)(PARTs)(CORPGRs) - (1 -SLDt)(BRSst-BRSsl) 
(4.4a) PPVMAX = MAX(PPVDEF,PPVRED) 
(4.5) PPVDEFt = CORREt + 
T SPMT - SCOST 
t t 
2: . 1 
j=l (1 + TBILL)r 
+ t97(PEXP) - (1 + ICCC t * YRINTt) CORREtJ (4.6) PPVREDt = PPVDEF 
(1 + TBILL )T 
s 
( 4. 7) PEXPt 1.10 * ( PRESt) 
(4.8) CPLACEt = CPLACEt-l + CPLACEt 
where subscript t = month, subscript s = cr op year, and superscript T 
numbe r of years the gr ain i s held in t he reserve. 
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Endogenous variables 
CPLACE = cumulative placement s , 
PLACE = monthly placements in the r eserve, 
Exogenous variables 
AVAIL • quantity available for reserve placement, 
BRS = beginning reserve s t ock l evel , 
CORPF = price received by farmers , 
CORRE = reserve loan r a te, 
CORPGR production for the c r op year , 
HARV proportion of corn harvested by mon th t, 
ICCC • CCC interest rate, 
PART m reserve participation r ate fo r the crop year, 
PEXP expected sales price, 
PPVDEF = present value of defaulting on the loan, 
PPVMAX = maximum present value of defaulting verses redeeming the 
reserve loan, 
PPVRED present value of redeeming the loan , 
PRE LS = reserve release price, 
SCOST = storage cost per bushel, 
SLD = proportion sold by month t, 
SPMT storage payment rate per bushel, 
TB ILL three- year treasur y bill r ate , 
YRINT = number of years interest is char ged on r eserve loans . 
As mentioned earlier, the coefficients fo r Equa ti on (4 . 3) wer e 
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estimated for the direct entry periods . Direct entry was 
permitted in 1979, 1981, and 1982 when producers were allowed to 
participate in the reserve without first participating in the 
nine-month loan program . The signs on the estimated coefficients 
appear to be theoretically correct . 
The identity for monthly quantities available for placement is 
shown in Equation (4.4) . The first t erm in t his equation measures the 
quantity of eligible grain harvested but not yet ma r keted at the 
beginning of month t in crop year s . The second term measures the 
quantity of grain removed f rom available supplies as a result of 
placements since the first month of the crop year. The following 
assumptions regarding available grain supplies for placement are made : 
1) only set-aside participants are eligible for placements, 
2) grain r eserve placements reduce availabili t y , but redemptions 
increase availabili t y by substitution with new crop grain, 
3) grain marketing reduces availability . 
The present value variable in (4.4a) reflects producers' decisions 
to take the option with the highest return; eithe r default on the loan 
or redeem it . Equations (4 . 5) and (4 . 6) show the comput ations for both 
options. The default option becomes attractive if the l oan rate is too 
high relative to the expected sales price . The expected sales price is 
assumed to be 110 percent of the release price . 
In Equation (4.6), shrinkage and quality deterioration are reflected 
by the 0 .97 ; 3 percent of the corn is assumed to become unusable during 
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the storage period. In this monthly model , Meyers et al. (1983b) have 
assumed two years as the maximum storage time. 
We can now proceed to describe the method used to calculate the 
annual coefficient s for Equation (4.1). The coefficients along with 
their elasticities are listed in Table 4 . 1 . 
Table 4 . 1. a The coefficients for the cumulative placement function 
Variable 1979/80 1981/82 1982/83 
CORPF -581. 00 b - 2550.84 -934.08 
[- 3 . 97] [-4.80] [- 1.74] 
CORRE 133 . 44 3199.48 1242 . 32 
[. 77] [6 . 14 ] [2.51) 
PRELS 440.96 1289 . 64 4 . 40 
(3 . 14] (3. 06 ] [ • 009] 
ICCC - 1888 . 00 -7306.50 0 
[- . 46] [-.81] [OJ 
TB ILL -800 . 00 -1433 . 00 - 495 . 00 
[-. 24] [- . 15] [-.04] 
CORPGR . 044 .1836 .1543 
[ . 95] [1.13] [ . 90] 
CPART 1305 . 25 179.10 4967 . 15 
[.75] [. 13] [ . 80] 
SPMT 2460 . 80 11437 .40 4652 . 10 
[1.77] [2 . 28] [.69] 
INTERCEPT 112. 90 -6303 . 80 -320.90 
a See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
b Elasticities are in brackets. 
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Using the described Meyer s e t al. (1983b) model , 12- mon th 
s imulations we r e run for each crop year listed in Table 4.1 . These 
simulations yielded "base values" for reserve cumulative placements for 
each c r op year . These base values, by the way , were close to the actual 
cumulative placement values at each cr op year' s end as r eported by the 
USDA . 
Next, the variables in the monthly mode l were s hocked t o see how 
cumulative placements would be affected. Table 4.2 shows t he actual 
o r base value of each variable and the shock it was given. The values 
li sted for CORPF, I CCC, and TBILL a r e the crop year ave r ages. In the 
monthly da t a , these three variables change f r om mo nth t o month, but for 
i llustration only the averages are shown in this t able . 
Table 4.2 . Base values fo r the cumulative placement variables and the 
administered shocksa 
1979/80 1981/82 1982/83 
Variable base shock base shock base shock 
CORPFb 2 . 52 +. 25 2.50 +. 25 2.68 +. 25 
CORRE 2 . 10 +. 25 2 . 55 + . 25 2 .90 + . 25 
PRE LS 2 . 63 + . 25 3 . 15 + . 25 3 . 25 +.25 
rcccb 0 . 09 + . 02 0 . 139 +.02 0 . 094 +.02 
TBILLb 0 . 110 +. 02 0 . 139 + . 02 0 . 102 +. 02 
CORPGR 7339.00 +200 8201 . 00 +200 8359 . 00 +200 
CPART . 211 +.20 1.00 +. 20 . 23 + . 20 
SPMT . 265 + . 10 . 265 +.10 . 265 + . 10 
aSee Appendix B for variable definitions . 
b12 month average . 
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Table 4 . 3 . Changes in cumul ative placemen t s r esulting from adminis t e r ed 
shocks8 
1979 / 80 1981/82 1982/83 
+.25 -. 25 +. 25 - .25 +.25 - .25 
oCPLACE -121 .87 168.63 - 528 . 67 746 . 75 - 252 . 60 214 . 43 
oCORPF 
oCPLACE 35. 84 -30 . 67 1455 . 22 - 144 . 52 365.06 - 256 . 10 
oCORRE 
a CPLACE 123.88 - 96.59 519. 69 -124.63 2 . 20 0 
oPRELS 
--- -- -------- ------------ ----- -----
+.02 -.02 +.02 -.02 +. 02 -. 02 
acPLACE - 36.13 39.38 -108.60 203.65 0 0 
arccc 
o CPLACE -15. 25 16.65 -27. 74 29 . 55 -9. 78 10 . 01 
o TBILL 
- ------- --- ------------------- - --- -
o CPLACE 
oPROD 
+200 - 200 
8 . 81 - 8 . 81 
+200 - 200 
36.72 -36. 72 
+200 - 200 
30.86 - 30 . 86 
- ------ ------ ------ --- - ------ ---- --
o CPLACE 
d PART 
+.2 - . 2 
194. 56 -327 . 54 
+.2 
- 71. 33 
-. 2 +.2 -. 2 
-. 3 877.77 - 1109 . 09 
------ ---- --- -- - ---- ----- - -- -- -- -- -
ac PLACE 
d SP~IT 
+ . 10 -. 10 
266.27 - 165.88 
+.10 - . 10 
1575 . 47 -712 . 0 
aSee Appendix B f or variable definitions . 
+.10 -. 10 
388 . 51 - 541.90 
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Dynamic simulations of the monthly model were run for each shock 
given to each variable for each of the three crop years. Table 4.3 
shows the impacts on cumulative placements resulting from each shock over 
the 12 month periods. The sizes of the adminis t ered shocks re flect 
reasonable guesses of possible variations for each variable. The shock 
sizes, in fact, approximate the standard deviation for many of the 
variables listed. These ranges seem large enough to provide realistic 
spreads in which each variable's coefficient can be computed. 
Equations (4.10) through (4.13) summarize the steps used to compute 
the annual coefficients in Table 4.1 for each year. 
(4 .10) BV - I V+s = CPV +s 
(4.11) BV - IV -s = CPV -s 
(4 . 12) ((CPV+s - CPV_s)/2) * l/lsl 2 S i 
8 
(4.13) ao = CPLACEt - E S i xi 
i=l 
Where BV base value simulation results for cumulative placements, 
IV+s impact value of cumulative placements resulting from a 
positive shock to the variable, 
IV_s impact value of cumulative placements resulting from a 
negative shock to the variable, 
CPV+s 
CPV - s 
s 
change in cumulative placements from a positive shock , 
change in cumulative placements from a negative shock , 
size of the shock given to each variable , 
intercept term, 
computed coefficient, 
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xi = independent variable, 
CPLACE actual quantity of cumulative placements at the end of 
the crop year. 
The calculated coefficients in Table 4.1 are, perhaps , not as good 
as if they had been estimated simultaneously within the supply and demand 
model. However, due to the limited reserve observations available , the 
technique used in calculating them has yielded proxies for the estimated 
coefficients that allow the reserve placement equation to be used 
endogenously in the supply and demand simulation. 
Note that the calculated coefficients in Table 4.1 vary among 
years. This is due to the nonlinear nature of the rese rve placement 
function. The coefficients are generally larger in 1981 which may be the 
result of high e ligible participation, since there was no set- aside 
program. The coefficient for CPART in 1981, however, is comparatively 
small. With the large eligible participation for that year, the marginal 
effect of additional participation becomes small. The large pr oduction 
coefficient (CORPGR) in 1981 may be the result of the producers gearing 
up for production. One might be wary of the large size of the SPMT 
coefficient for 1981. 
In 1982, the coefficient for the CCC interest rate (ICCC) is 0 and 
the coefficient for the treasury bill (TBILL) is only -495. These 
relatively small sizes may be the result of the high loan rate for that 
year. The high loan rate caused the default op tion to be a dominate 
factor, which caused the interest rate effects to be vary small compared 
to other years. The release price coefficient (PRELS) in 1982 is also 
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small. The release price in 1982 was set quite high resulting in 
additional effects on cumulative placements to be small. 
Ksti.Jllation and Validation 
The parameters for the remaining behavioral equations can now be 
estimated. They are estimated using nonlinear two stage least squares to 
produce asymptotically unbiased estimates. 
The following assumptions are made about the error term for the 
estimation procedure: 
1) each equation has a random error with a normal distribution and 
an expected value of zero, E(u) = O, 
2) the error terms have 0 covariance, that is , their values are 0 
between two observations, 
3) the error terms are uncorrelated with the predetermined 
variables, 
4) the contemporaneous covariance matrix of the err or is 
nonsingular, E(uu ') \ O. 
The period of estimation, 1963-1982, is a long enough historical 
period to provide enough observations for the analysis. The short 
existence of the reserve presented a problem, which is why t he parameters 
for the placement equation had to be calculated as described in the 
previous section of this chapter. 
There are more predetermined var iables than observations in this 
model, as a result, the principal component t echnique is applied in the 
first estimation stage. Fifteen principal components were a rbitrarily 
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chosen from all the exogenous variables to be used as instrumental 
variables . 
The results of the simultaneous estimation procedure are presented 
in Table 4.4. The t-values a r e in pa r entheses a nd the e la s ticities 
e valuated at the means a re in brackets below the estima ted pa r ame t e rs . 
The R2 and Durbin-Watsin s tatistics are listed on the righ t side of each 
equa tion. This model has two equations with lagged dependent variables , 
which renders the DW test less applicable. But, as Huyser (1983) points 
out , the DW test is still a powerful indicator of any serial correlation 
pr oblems in these situations. 
Acreage Response 
The statistical properties of the corn acreage equation are quite 
good. The high R2 indicates the equation explains almost all of the 
historical variation in corn acreage pl an ted. All of the variables are 
significant a t t he l percent level except for the effective 
support/soybean price ratio (significant at the 10 percent level). The 
diver sion policy variable is highly significant in influencing corn 
acreage planted. Acreage response is fai r ly inelastic with respect to 
the corn and soybean pr ice as reflected by the net returns ratio. 
Feed Demand 
All of the variables in the feed demand equa tion a r e s i gnificant at 
the 10 percent level except for the wheat price and lagged feed demand. 
Instead of esti mating this equation in the usual manner, it was turned 
around into the fo r m 
Table 4.4 . Parame ter estimates for structural a b equations ' 
,.. 
R2 p D.W. 
Acreage 
(1) CORSA! 39.42 + 3.53C~~~RE + CORPEl CORSA - 43 97CORPDl o. 962 1.83 14.87 SOYPF + .428 • CORPF 
(9.02) (2.61) ( 1. 62) (S.84) (-11.85) 
[.OS J [. 06] [. 441 [.07] 
Feed demand 
(2) CORDF = -2566.43 CORPF SOMPM WHEPF - 884 ·46FPINDEX + 4 •55 FPINDEX + 316 •23FPINDEX 0.978 2.90 
(-.91) (-1.74) (2 . 43) ( 1. 15) 
(-.35] [.13 ] [. 17] 
+ 53 . 38 GCAUTST + 231. 37 LIVIFl + .302 CORDF_1 (1.78) ( 1. 55) ( 1. 24) .c-
[ 1. 361 [ . 10] [. 30] N 
Food demand 
(3) CORDH = CORPF 211. 97 - 39. 56WHEIWl + . 350 CENl 0.281 0.981 1.61 
(4 . 64 ) (-1.24) (17.94) 
(-.10] [. 62 ] 
a 
See Appendix B for varia ble de finitions . 
b 
The t-values are in par entheses and e l asticities evaluated a t the means are in brackets. 
Table 4 . 4 . (continued) 
World Export demand 
(4) CORXTOT = 581 . 27 - 464.65 CORSOYEU + 1313 . 77 LIVPEUJl - . 050 COR9SRF 
(1.41) (-2.25) (4 . 63) (-3.39) 
[-.28] [l. 41 ] [-.52] 
- 406.78 SHIFT72 + 553 . 56 SHIFT79 
(-4 . 60) (7.47) 
Private stock demand 
CORPF 
(5) CORHCClX = 1166 . 19 - 491.29WHEIWl - . 250 (CORHPRRE + CORHHUN) - . 053 CORPGRl 
Total Loans 
(3 . 64) ( - 3 . 32) ( - 3.86) 
+ . 073 
(2.39) 
[.95] 
[-1.26] [-. 31 ] 
CORPGR - .550 NRL - 4 . 68 IPCA 
(-2.94) (-.30) 
[-.37] [-.10] 
( - 2 . 24) 
[-.69] 
ICCC (6) CORTPSL = - 818.91 + 1408.92 CPRATW - 1198 . 28IPCA + 1469.50 CRISK + 0 . 107 CORPGR 
( - 1.74) (4 . 09) (-3.09) (2.52) 
[2.01] [-1.34] [.16] 
+ 440.04 CPART2 + 747.13 WAIVE81 + 320 . 22 RSHIFT 
(3 . 14) (4.13) (1 . 83) 
[. 31] 
Nine-month redemptions 
(7) CORTRED = 10 48 - 7 39CORPL - 9. 57 IICPCCAC + . 0006 CORPGRl ' . CORPF 
(5.10) (-4. 36) (-4.86) 
[-1.12] [-1. 12] 
(4.31) 
[. 61] 
(2 .11) 
[. 98] 
0 . 983 1. 97 
0 . 818 3. 00 
0 .944 1.65 
0 .928 1.63 
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P = P + Q - <ao + 13 1 P + fJ i xi) 
t o a llow the mode l to solve f or the equilibr ium price. 
The e las tic ity wi th r espect to corn price a t - 0.35 is consis tent 
with other studies, while the soymeal price is a little more inelas tic at 
0.13. The elasticity for grain consuming animal units is lower than the 
1.46 obtained by the Center f or Nationa l Food and Agricul tural Policy 
a t t he Unive r si ty of Missouri-Columbia a nd a little higher than the 1.08 
by Baumes and Meye r s (1980). 
Food Demand 
In the food equation, price is left in because it has the right 
sign, even though it is statistically insignificant. The a mount spent on 
nondurable goods and services is a very significant determinant of food 
dema nd f or co rn. This equat ion has bee n corrected for autocorrelation. 
The es timated value of p is listed to the right of the equation. 
World Export Demand 
The specif i cation for the world export demand is simila r t o Westhoff 
and Meyers (1984) . The equation explains the histor ical var iation well 
as evidenced by the R2 of 0.983. All of the variables are significant at 
the 1 percent level e xcept fo r corn/soymeal r a tio which is significant a t 
the 5 per cent l eve l. It ma y be less than desi r able t o have the two dummy 
var iables be as s ignificant as they are , since they a r e used to reflect 
unexpl ained shifts in t o t al world exports . 
The co r n/soymeal elasticity is slight l y smaller than the -0.34 
obtained by Westhoff and Meyers . The elasticity on the index of EEC and 
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Japanese poultry and hog production is a little larger than Westhoff and 
!.feyers' 1.04 and Baumes and Meyers' 1.17. The results show Europe and 
Japan to be significant determinants of world export demand for corn. 
Private Stock Demand 
2 The private stock demand equation has the lowest R of all the 
2 
equations in the model, but it is still quite satisfactory. The low R 
was not totally unexpected since stock equations have typically been 
harder to estimate. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this equation 
estimates free stocks excluding those under nine- month l oan. Stocks 
under loan have become one of the regressors in the equation. All of the 
variables are significant at the 5 percent level except for the PCA 
interest r ate. The PCA interest was left in because it had the correct 
sign and because its plausible to have some reflection of opportunity 
cost in a stock equation. 
The pr ice e lasticity of -1.26 is consistent with the -1.209 obtained 
by Morton (1982) for feed grains and the -1.24 by the University of 
Missouri. It i s slightly less than the -1.53 obtained by Baumes and 
Meyers. The coefficient on the government s t ocks, reserve plus CCC, is 
nearly the same as Morton 's 0.259 for feedgrains and is also consistent 
with the coefficient Baumes and Womack (1980) obtained in their analysis 
on private stocks of corn. These results indicate that a one bushel 
increase in government stocks reduce private stocks by about 0.25 
bushels , thus increasing total carryover by 0.75 bushels. The 
coefficient on nine- month loan carryover indicates an even larger 
displacement on free, no loan stocks . For every bushel increase in 
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nine-month carryover stocks, nonloan free stocks are reduced by .55 
bushels. There is a high level of substitution between these stocks, 
which is why nine-month stocks are considered to be part of free stocks , 
since they are redeemable upon dema nd. 
The D.W. statistic for this equation is a little higher than 
desired, but it is still in the inconclusive region of the test at the 5 
percent level. 
Total Loans 
The statistical results for the t otal loan equation are quite good. 
All of the variables are significant at the 5 p~rcent level and the R2 is 
high. The elastici t y of total loans with respect to the loan/price ratio 
is lower than t he 4.14 obtained by Miller, Meyers, and Lancaster (1978). 
Their definition of the ratio, however, did not include the farmer-owned 
reserve entry price. The elasticity for the interest rate ratio is more 
elastic than - 0.84 obtained by Miller et al. The risk and production 
variables have similar elasticities in both analyses. 
The significance of RSHIFT indicates the reserve program in general 
has had a significant effect on the demand for CCC Loans. 
Nine-Month Loan Redemptions 
All of the variables i n the redemption equation are signif icant at 
the 5 percent level. Redemptions are fairly elastic with respect t o the 
loan/price ratio and the interest rate ratio. A 10 percent increase in 
the price , ceteris paribus, would lead to an approximate 11.2 percent 
increase in redemptions. An increase in the market interest rate , 
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ceteris paribus, would have the same effect according t o the elasticity 
on the interest ratio. 
The future price, as proxied by expected production, is a 
significant factor in redemptions. The elasticity indicates a 10 percent 
increase in expected production will cause redemptions to rise by a 
little over 6 percent. 
Overall , the equations have satisfactory results. All the variables 
have the correct signs and the R21s are quite high. In the next section, 
the historical simulation capabilities of the model will be examined. 
Va1~dation of the Model 
In the validation run, the model is dynamically simulated over the 
1963-1982 period. The dynamic simulation uses the solved values from the 
simulation to feed future lagged endogenous values. The simulation 'was 
done using Newton's method from the SIMNLIN pr ocedure of SAS/ETS. There 
are several criterion used to evaluate the model's simulation 
performance. Pindyke and Rubinfeld (1981) can be checked for more 
indepth discussions. 
One criterion used to evaluate dynamic simula tions is the root mean 
square error. RH square error is a measure of the derivation of. the 
simulated value from the actual value over the time period. It is 
computed as follows: 
IU<ISE 
where 
1 T 
~ 
T t=l 
Y~ = simulated value of Yt , 
ya actual value, 
t 
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T = number of periods in the simulation • 
A more informative approach is to express RMSE in percentage terms. 
This allows comparisons between variables to be made . RM percent error 
is expressed as 
RM percent error 
T 
L 
t=l 
A value of O, or close to it, is desirable for the RH percent error. 
Table 4.5 shows the RM square errors and RM percent errors for all 
the variables. Generally, RM percent errors of less than 0.2 are 
considered very good. If a variable is small in size, any small error in 
the simulation will produce a high proportional error. This is the case 
with the CRISK variable. All of the variables , except CRISK, have RM 
square errors of less than one, and a large majority (23 out of 32) are 
around 0 . 2 or below. 
Another criterion used to evaluate a simulation is Theil ' s 
inequality coefficient def i ned as 
J l T Ya)2 - L (Ys -T t=l t t 
1 T (Ys)2 +j 1 T (Ya)2 L L T t=l t T t=l t 
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Table 4.5 . Statistics of fita 
Va riable N RMS error RSM % error 
CORPF 20 0 . 183 0 . 091 
CORDF 20 162 . 329 0.043 
CORDH 20 22 . 722 0 . 053 
RCOPDPF 20 0 . 012 0 .078 
CORSAl 20 2.146 0 . 030 
CORECPC 20 0 . 036 0 . 088 
CORXTOT 20 82 .323 0 . 084 
CORSOYEU 20 0.045 0 . 064 
CORPGRl 20 165.921 0 . 035 
CORHCClX 20 76 . 701 0 . 218 
CORMX 20 82.323 0 . 102 
CORNRE 20 16 . 449 0.241 
RSCNRE 20 0 . 178 0. 241 
CORTPSL 20 137 . 255 0.554 
CORTRED 20 92 . 159 0 . 521 
z 20 0.073 0 . 510 
CORPFA 20 0 . 141 0 . 062 
CR I SK 20 0 . 054 18.134 
CPRATW 20 0 . 077 0 . 088 
CPRAT 20 0.076 0 . 088 
NRL 20 114.533 0 . 609 
CORPRES 20 73 . 238 0 . 101 
CORHPRRE 20 49 . 547 0 . 045 
CORHT 20 119 . 974 0 . 149 
CPLACE 20 49 . 547 0 . 022 
TSP MT 20 8 . 316 0 . 030 
NMRED 20 117 . 911 o. 786 
NNLOAN 20 255.013 0 . 621 
FORLOAN 20 204 . 474 0.079 
NETNM 20 220 . 986 0 . 630 
NETFOR 20 204 . 474 0 . 241 
NET COST 20 208.183 0 . 507 
a 
See Appendix B f or variable definitions . 
so 
Theil's inequality coefficient can be broken into three parts known as 
the proportions of inequality : 
um (Y5 - ya)2 
(l/T) E (Ys - Ya)2 t t 
ca - a )2 
us s a 
(l/T) E (Ys _ Ya)2 
t t 
2(1 - p) a a 
Uc s a 
(l/T) E (Ys _ Ya)2 t t 
where a and a are the standard deviations of the actual and simulated 
a s 
values. 
Um, called the bias proportion, indicates systematic error and is 
the difference between the means of the actual and simulated values. It 
is desirable to have a um of close to o. s U , called the variance or 
regression proportion, indicates the ability of the model to replicate 
the degree of variability of the actual data . It is also desirable to 
have the Us be very small or O, which means that the simulated model 
tracks the historical variation well. Uc, called the covariance 
proportion, measures the remaining error after deviations from average 
value and variabilities have been accounted for. The values of um, Us, 
and Uc are weighted so that their sum is 1.0. 
If the value of accuracy, U, is zero, the simulated values are 
equal to the actual values for all the periods. On t he other hand, if 
U=l, or close to it, the simulated values vary significantly from the 
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Table 4 . 6. Theil' s forecast a e rror measures 
Relative DecomEosition 
Change Bias Reg r ess Dis turb Accuracy 
Vari able N (MSE) ( UM) (US) ( UC) (U) 
CORPF 20 0 . 0093 0 . 02 0.05 0 .93 0 . 0483 
CORDF 20 0 . 00 19 0 . 01 o.oo 0 .99 0 . 0000 
CORDH 20 0 . 0030 o.oo 0 . 66 0 .34 0 . 0001 
RCOPDPF 20 0 . 0114 o.oo 0 . 00 LOO 0 . 6699 
CORSAl 20 0 . 0009 0 . 00 o.oo LOO 0 . 0004 
CORECPC 20 0 . 0077 0 . 00 0.24 0 . 76 0 . 2789 
CO RX TOT 20 0.0077 0.00 0 . 08 0.92 0 .0001 
CORSOYEU 20 0 . 0051 0 . 01 0 . 01 0 .97 0 . 0987 
CORPGRl 20 0. 0013 0 . 00 o.oo L OO 0 . 0000 
CORHCClX 20 0 . 0346 0 . 02 0 . 11 0 . 87 0 . 0004 
CORMX 20 0 . 0120 0 . 00 0 . 03 0 . 97 0 . 0001 
CORNRE 20 0 . 0576 0.00 0 . 07 0 .93 0 . 0024 
RSCNRE 20 0.0595 o.oo 0.24 0 . 76 0 . 2374 
CORTPSL 20 0 . 4250 0 . 03 0 . 09 0 .88 0 . 0009 
CORTRED 20 0 .4957 0 . 05 0 .21 0 . 74 0 . 0022 
z 20 0.0443 0.01 0 . 74 0 . 25 0 . 2429 
CORPFA 20 0 . 0045 0 . 03 0 . 05 0 . 93 0 . 0350 
CRISK 20 53 . 1216 0. 15 0 . 72 0 . 13 57 . 2045 
CPRATW 20 0 . 0085 0.02 0 . 01 0 . 98 0 . 1093 
CPRAT 20 0 . 0085 0 . 02 0 . 01 0 . 97 0 . 1103 
NRL 20 3.6863 0 . 07 0 . 06 0 . 88 0 . 0063 
CORPRES 20 L 2501 0 . 25 0 .71 0.04 0 . 0016 
CORHPRRE 20 0 . 2423 0 . 24 o. 70 o .. 06 0 . 0005 
CORHT 20 0 . 0269 0 . 00 0 . 02 0 .98 0 . 0001 
CPL.ACE 20 0 . 0055 0 . 35 0 . 05 0 . 60 0 . 0000 
TSP MT 20 0 . 0024 0 . 20 0 . 05 0 . 75 0 . 0003 
NMRED 20 2.5233 0 . 02 0 . 02 0 . 97 0 . 0049 
NMLOAN 20 0 . 5356 0 . 03 0 .13 0 . 84 0 . OOll 
FORLOAN 20 0 . 0613 0 . 01 0.00 0 .98 0 . 0001 
NETNM 20 4 . 2130 0 . 11 0 . 01 0 . 88 0 . 0049 
NETFOR 20 0 . 2670 0. 29 0 . 49 0 . 22 0 . 0004 
NETCOST 20 3 . 9678 0 . 14 0 . 06 0 . 80 0 . 0018 
a See Appendi x B fo r variable definitions. 
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actual values. 
Theil ' s forecast error measures are given in Table 4 . 6 . Most all 
of the endogenous variables have a small bias or systematic error, which 
is desirable. A few of the variables, CORDH, Z, CRISK, CORHPRRE, 
CORPRES, NETFOR, have a larger variance proportion t han desired. 
However , for Z and CRISK, the actual values a r e very small , so any small 
variation will create larger Us values. Most of the variables have 
small accur acy values which is desi rable . 
Another impor tant criterion fo r evaluating the historical 
pe r formance of a model is to examine the tur ning points of simulated 
values of major endogenous variables ver ses their ac t ual values . A 
tur ning point is a sudden change in t he historical data , and it is 
desirable t o have the simula t ion t r ack those changes. 
Figures 4 . 1 - 4 . 16 show the plots of the actual and simulated values 
for some of the key endogenous variables . Price seems to t r ack well 
excep t for turning point erro r s in 1963 and 1976 . The model captur es the 
l arge increase in the actual price between 1971 and 1974 . 
The stock equations , total, reserve a nd private, non-loan carryover , 
are able to simula t e the histori ca l variation quite well . There are two 
turning point errors fo r private stocks in 1963 and 1965 , but after that 
it follows the ac t ual data closely. There a r e no turning point e rrors in 
t he r eser ve stock pr edictions , however , keep in mind that 1977 , 1978 , and 
1980 are exogenous for this variable . For total s t ocks, there is only 
one turning point error , in 1967, and the actual and simulated values are 
close to each other. Carryover under nine-month l oan has the poorest 
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Figure 4 . 7 . Plot of actual and simulated feed use (CORDF) 
900 + 
I 
I ~IL BU 1 
850 • 
800 + 
750 • 
700 • 
650 + 
600 + 
550 • 
500 + 
450 + 
400 + 
350 + 
300 + 
60 
SIMULATED I 
\I 
I 
ACTUAL 
--------·-----+-----·-----+-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----------
1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 197~ 1977 1979 1981 
YE AP 
Figur e 4 . 8 . Plot of actua l and simula ted food use (CORDH) 
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Figure 4 . 9 . Plot of actual and simulated expected acreage 
planted (CORSA l ) 
62 
~IL BU 
2250 + 
2000 + 
1750 + 
1500 + 
1250 + 
ACTUAL 
1000 + 
750 + i\ 
SIMULATED 
500 + 
250 + 
0 + 
-------·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·----·-----·----------
19 6 3 1965 10 t 7 106 9 1971 197 3 197~ 1977 19 7 9 19 8 1 
Figure 4 .10 . Plot of actua l and simul a ted quantity placed 
under price support loan (CORTPSL) 
63 
MIL BU 
900 + 
8 00 + 
700 + 
600 + 
ACTUAL 
500 + 
\ 
\ SIMULATED 
4100 + \/ 
\ 
300 + 1 
I 
.200 + 
100 + 
0 + 
-------+-----+-----+-----+-----·-----·-----·-----·-----+-----+----------
1963 1965 1 9~7 1969 1 97 1 1973 1975 1077 1979 1981 
YF. AR 
Figure 4 .11 . Plot of actua l and simulated n i ne- mon t h redemptions 
(CORTRED) 
64 
MIL BU 
4500 + 
4000 + 
3500 + 
3000 + 
ACTUAL .......... , 
1
\nruLATED 
2500 + 1 
2000 + 
1500 + 
1000 + 
500 + 
0 + 
--------·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----+----·-----+-----·----------
1963 196 5 1967 19 69 1971 1973 1975 1 977 1979 1 98 1 
YEA~ 
Figure 4 . 12 . Plot of actual and simulated reserve cumulative 
placements (CPLACE) 
1 600 
MlL $ 
1500 
1400 
1300 
12 00 
1100 
1 000 
900 
800 
700 
600 
5 00 
400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
65 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• t 
I\ 
• 
/ I 
• I \ 
SIMULATED 
\I I • 
I 
I + I 
• I I 
ACTUAL I 
• \ I I + 
+ I 
• I 
/\ • I \ 
./ ,1 r ' + I 
• ¢ 
--------+-----+-----+-----+-----·-----·-----·-----·-----·-----+-----·----
1963 196 5 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 198 1 
Y E AR 
Figure 4 .13 . Plot of actual and simulated net cost for nine-
month loans (NETNM) 
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pe r formance of the stock equations even though there are only three 
turning point errors . The difference between the actual and simulated 
values are fairly large for 1964 , 1977, and 1981. 
The remaining demand side simulations are in Figures 4 . 6- 4 . 8. Total 
exports has only two turning poin t errors~in 1966 and 1981 . Feed has 
one e rror, but the difference between the actual and simulated values 
become relatively pronounced between 1978 and 1980. Some of that 
differ ence may be a result of turning this equation around to solve for 
price. After 1968, simulated food values remain close to the actual . 
For corn acres planted , the simulated and actual values are close , 
particularly after 1966. The la r ge drop in 1982 is due to the payment-
in- kind program which included a large land diversion . The model tracked 
the acr eage drop well. There a re turning point errors in 1964, 1977, and 
1980 for ac reage planted. 
The total loan , redemption, and cumulative placement equations also 
do all right in tracking the actual variation . Afte r the first four 
year s , total loans and nine-month r edemptions do a fine job of tracking 
hi storical values. 
The government cost simulations respond in almost the same manner as 
the variables they are associated with . The net nine- month loan outlays 
variable appears t o have the largest discrepancy between actual and 
simulated values . 
Overall, the simulated series tend to reproduce the actual series , 
except for a few short-run fluctuations . The incidence of turning point 
e r rors with r espec t to the total number o f turning points is low. 
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A final criterion used in this analysis is the stability test. 
Stability is tested by administering an exogenous shock to the model, 
rerunning the simulation, and then checking to see if the endogenous 
variables return to their base simulation values over time. The faster 
they return to equilibrium, the more stable the model is considered to 
be. The shock in this analysis was administered to expected yield in 
1975. Expected yield was lowered from 88 bushels per acre to 84 bushels 
per acre harvested. Since the shock is on expected yield , the major 
effects will not be noted until 1976. Table 4.7 shows the base 
simulation values along with the change and percent change in those 
values as a result of the shock. 
The immediate effect of an expected yield decrease is seen in 1975 
in expected production, which decreases by 276 million bushels , or by 
over 4 percent. Effect of the shock on production decreases and reaches 
0 percent by 1982. The level of expected production for 1975 becomes the 
current production level for 1976. The 1976 price rises by almost 11 
percent and then quickly diminishes to a 0 percent change in 1980. 
The immediate effect on the stock levels is to dec r ease them. 
Theory would imply that a price increase causes stock levels to decline 
as producers become more inclined to sell them off . The lower product i on 
level itself would result in the use of more stocks for feeding 
operations . The effects of the shock on stocks diminish to nearly 
0 percent by 1982. 
The effects on total loan demand and nine-month redemptions are 
large. Both decrease by 68 percent and 63 percent respectively in 1976, 
Table 4 . 7. Dynam!cbimpact of a one year decrease in expected corn 
yield , 
a 
Expected pr oduction 
(mil. bu.) 
Corn price 
($/bu . ) 
Private stocks 
excluding loan 
carr yover (mil . bu . ) 
Total stocks 
(mil. bu.) 
Carryover under 
loan (mil.bu.) 
Reserve stocks 
(mil.bu . ) 
Feed (mil. bu.) 
Food (mil.bu . ) 
U.S. exports 
(mil. bu . ) 
Tot al loans 
(mil.bu.) 
Nine- month 
redemptions 
(mil. bu.) 
Cumulative 
r eserve placement s 
(mil. bu . ) 
* signifies less than 1. 
Year: 
Base 
Change 
Per cent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Percen t change 
Base 
Change 
Percent change 
Base 
Change 
Per cent change 
bExpec t ed yield in 1975 was reduced by 5 percent (87.bu . /ac . to 84 
bu . /ac . ) 
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1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
6313 6383 7059 7736 6579 8066 8487 . 4304 
- 276 35 17 - 8 - 3 - 1 -* * 
- 4 . 38 . 55 . 25 - .10 - . 05 -. 01 . 00 . 01 
2.20 2 . 52 2. 66 2. 68 3 . 59 2 . 59 2 . 70 
. 23 . 03 - . 03 .oo .oo .oo .oo 
10 . 65 1. 21 -1. 05 -. 07 .oo .oo .oo 
647 500 486 575 413 176 270 
- 48 1 7 * - 1 - 1 - * 
- 7.41 . 19 1. 48 . 03 - . 29 - . 34 -. 08 
725 906 1170 1478 894 2045 3182 
- 108 - 11 8 * - 1 -* - * 
-14 . 92 - 1.19 . 66 . 01 -. 07 -. 02 -. 01 
77 . 22 77 . 96 42 . 96 115 . 48 57 . 26 516 . 79 198 . 87 
- 60 - 12 * - 1 1 1 * 
- 77. 90 - 14 . 97 1. 00 - .67 . 97 . 29 . 21 
531. 26 1051. 21 1547 . 82 
l - 1 - * 
. 13 -. 13 - . 02 
3833 3700 3997 4217 4188 4350 4590 
- 136 - 59 - 4 -* - 2 -1 -* 
- 3. 55 - 1.58 -. 09 - . 01 - . OS -. 02 -.01 
528 567 622 683 726 782 837 
- 5 - 1 * * - * - * * 
- . 90 - . 10 . 08 . 01 .01 .oo .oo 
1750 1918 2158 2508 2230 1764 1908 
- 17 - 3 2 * -* -* -* 
. - . 95 -. 15 . 10 . 01 - .01 .oo .oo 
244 863 602 525 777 2080 1542 
- 165 - 42 - 32 -3 10 3 2 
- 67 . 69 -4 . 81 - 5. 27 -. 66 1.30 . 12 . 13 
167 548 413 261 637 602 186 
- 105 - 30 - 32 - 3 10 2 1 
- 62 . 97 - 5 . 43 - 7. 79 -1. 31 1.50 . 40 . 31 
264 1069 1691 
1 - 1 - * 
.27 - . 13 - . 02 
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but the shock effect diminishes quickly thereafter . 
The yield decline causes the other demand components to decline, due 
mainly to the higher market price . The effects of the shock f or these 
components, too, diminish rapidly . 
All of the var iables seem t o move back to their equilibrium values 
after the expected yield variable has been shocked, hence , we can say the 
model is stable . 
In summary, the model appears to do a satisfactory job of simulating 
historical behavior . In the next chapter, a further analysis will be 
presented using the dynamic simulation of this model . 
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CHAPTER 5. DYNAMIC SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
The model developed in thi s s tud y is used in this chapte r to 
evaluate the effects of exogenous shocks on major endogenous variables . 
The simulation is run to obtain impact values which are compared to the 
values from the base simulation. Tables 5.1 through 5.3 lis t the actual 
values and impacts in ac tual a nd percentage terms that result from 
changes in the selected exogenous va riables . A brief discussion of the 
three scenarios follows. 
Scenario 1: Lower Reserve Loan Rate and Release Price for 1982 
The reserve loan rate in 1981 was set by taking the 1980 reserve 
loan rate level plus $ . 15 . This scenario examines what would have 
happened had the policymakers used that same kind of decision t o 
determine the 1982 reserve l oan rate level. In this scenario the 
r ese rve loan rate is set a t a level that is $ . 15 gr ea t er than the 
previous year's loan rate. Instead of the ac tual $2 .90 per bushel, the 
reserve loan r ate becomes only $2 . 70 per bushel . The release pr ice f or 
this scenario is 115 percent of the r eserve l oan rate, or only $3 . 10 per 
bushel instead of the actual $3 . 25 per bushel . 
The r esults i ndicate a resulting decline in reserve loans and 
reserve ending stocks . The decline in reser ve stocks i s l a r ger than the 
increases in t he other stock ca t ego ries , causing total stocks to decl ine 
by mo r e than SO million bushels . Lower s t ock accumulation causes the 
mar ke t price to decline by $ . 10 per bushel. The lower pr ice causes the 
other demand compone nt s , food use , feed use, and exports t o increase . 
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The lower reserve l oan rate causes the demand fo r total l oans to 
decline, but carryover under nine-month loan increases by over 100 
million bushels. Nine- month redemp tions increase as the quantity of 
nine-month loans avai l abl e fo r redemption increase , due t o the lower 
rese rve placements. 
Wi t h a targe t price of $2 . 70 per bushel in 1982, the lower market 
price results in a larger deficiency payment to producers. The payment 
jumps by $178 million; almost 80% . The highe r deficiency payment, 
however, is offset by declines of 448 million in the o ther loan outlay 
categories t o y ield a decrease in total net outlays of $270 million. 
Scenario 2: Equating the Farmer-owned Reserve and Nine-month Loan Rates 
Table 5.2 gi ves t he results of se tting the r eserve loan rate equal 
t o the nine-month l oan rate . The reserve l oan r ate was lowered from 
$2.55 to $2 .40 in 1981 and f rom $2. 90 t o $2 . 55 in 1982 . The re lease 
price was set at 115 percent of the l oan rates . 
The l ower l oan rates cause reserve placements and reserve stocks to 
decline by 516 million bushel s in 1981 and by 323 million bushels in 1982. 
The large drawdown in reserve s t ock levels results in lower total stock 
levels, as a result, the price also declines in both years . Lower 
carryin supplies fo r 1982 cause the pr ice t o fall by less t han it did in 
1981. 
There is a split effect on car r yover under nine- month l oan . In 
1981 , these s t ocks experience a large increase which appear s to displace 
nonloan private stocks, while in 1982 carryover under loan decreases . 
Total l oan demand increases in 1981 and decreases in 1982. 
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Table 5.1. Impact of a lower reserve loan rate and release price in 
1982a 
1982 
Corn price ($/bushel) Actual 2.68 
Change - . 10 
Percent change - 3.7 
Total stocks Actual 3120 
(mil. bu.) Change -52 
Percent change -1. 7 
Private stocks Actual 293 
excluding those Change s 
under loan (mil. bus.) Percent change 1. 7 
Reserve stocks Actual 1550 
(mil. bus.) Change -158 
Percent change -10.2 
Carryover under Actual 110 
nine- month loan Change 101 
(mil. bu.) Percent change 91.8 
Food use Actual 883 
(mil. bu . ) Change 1 
Percent change .11 
Feed use Actual 4522 
(mil. bu.) Change 42 
Percent change .93 
U. S. exports Actual 1501 
(mil. bu.) Change 9 
Percent change .60 
Expected Actual 4121 
production Change - 100 
(mil. bu . ) Percent change -2.4 
To t al loans Actual 1576 
(mil. bu.) Change - 40 
Percent change -2.5 
a 
$2.70 per 1982 reserve loan was lowered from $2.90 per bushel to 
bushel. The release price was lowered from $3.25 per bushel to $3 .10 
per bushel. 
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Table 5 . 1. (continued) 
Reserve Actual 1435 
placements Change -158 
(mil. bu.) Percent change -11 . 0 
Nine-month Actual 266 
redemptions Change 17 
(mil. bu.) Percent change 6.4 
Deficiency payments Actual 226 
(mil. $) Change 178 
Percent change 78 . 8 
Net outlays Actual 2114 
(mil. $) Change -270 
Percent change - 12.8 
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Table 5.2 . Impact of equating the reserve loan rate to the nine- month 
loan ratea 
Corn price ($/bushel) 
Total stocks 
(mil. bu . ) 
Private stocks 
excluding those 
under loan (mil. bus.) 
Reserve stocks 
(mil. bus . ) 
Carryover under 
nine- month loan 
(mil. bu.) 
Food use 
(mil. bu.) 
Feed use 
(mil. bu . ) 
U. S. exports 
(mil. bu . ) 
Expected 
production 
(mil. bu .) 
Total loans 
(mil. bu.) 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
1981 
2.50 
- .19 
- 7.6 
2174 
-98 
- 4.5 
263 
-147 
- 55 . 9 
1310 
-516 
-39 . 4 
299 
566 
189 . 3 
792 
3 
. 39 
4201 
79 
1.9 
1640 
17 
1.0 
8235 
-69 
-.84 
1969 
138 
7.0 
1982 
2.68 
-. 13 
- 4.8 
3120 
- 261 
- 8.4 
293 
158 
53.9 
1550 
-323 
-20.8 
110 
- 97 
- 88.2 
883 
2 
.23 
4522 
81 
1.8 
1501 
12 
.80 
4121 
-157 
- 3.8 
1576 
- 28 
-1.8 
a 
For 1981, the reserve loan rate was lowered from $2 . 55 per bushel 
to $2.40 per bushel. For 1982, the reserve l oan rate was lowered from 
$2 .90 per bushel to $2 .55. For both years, the release price is 115 
percent of the loan rates. 
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Table 5.2 . (continued) 
Reserve Ac t ual 1328 1435 
placements Change -516 - 323 
(mil. bu.) Pe rcent change - 38.9 - 22 . 5 
Nine- month Actual 381 266 
redemptions Change 88 -1 25 
(mil. bu.) Per cent change 23 . 1 - 47 . 0 
Deficiency payments Actual 226 
(mil . $) Change 97 
Per cent change 42 .9 
Ne t program Actual 3952 2114 
outlays Change - 99 - 161 
(mil. $) Percent change - 2 . 5 -7.6 
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Table 5.3. Impact of a yield reductiona 
Corn price ($/bushel) 
Total stocks 
(mil. bu.) 
Private stocks 
excluding those 
under loan (mil. bus.) 
Reserve stocks 
(mil. bus . ) 
Carr yover under 
nine-month loan 
(mil. bu.) 
Food use 
(mil. bu.) 
Feed use 
(mil. bu . ) 
U. S. exports 
(mil. bu.) 
Current 
production 
(mil. bu.) 
Total l oans 
(mil. bu . ) 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Ac t ual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Per cent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
Actual 
Change 
Percent change 
1981 
2 . 50 
.14 
5 . 6 
2174 
- 300 
-13.8 
263 
21 
8 . 0 
1310 
-418 
-31.9 
299 
97 
32 . 4 
792 
- 2 
-. 25 
4201 
-62 
-1. 47 
1640 
- 12 
-.73 
8119 
- 395 
-4.9 
1969 
-142 
- 7.2 
1982 
2 . 68 
.36 
13.4 
3120 
- 482 
- 15 . 4 
293 
93 
31. 7 
1550 
-402 
- 25 .9 
110 
-172 
-156.4 
883 
- 5 
-. 57 
4522 
-177 
- 3.91 
1501 
- 32 
-2.13 
8235 
-396 
-4.8 
1576 
-274 
-17 . 4 
~ield was reduced by 5 percent in 1981 and 1982 (from 109.9 
bu./ac. to 104 and from 114 .5 bu./ac . t o 108 . 8 for 1981 and 1982 , 
respectively) . 
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Table 5.3. (continued) 
Reserve Actual 1328 1435 
placements Change -418 -402 
(mil. bu.) Percent change -31.S -28. 0 
Nine-month Actual 381 266 
redemptions Change 178 - 117 
(mil. bu.) Percent change 46.7 -44. 0 
Deficiency payments Actual 226 
(mil. $) Change - 198 
Percent change - 87.6 
Net outlays Actual 3952 2114 
(mil. $) Change -888 -701 
Percent change -22.S -33 . 2 
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In 1981, there was no opportunity for producer s t o receive 
deficiency payments as the target price was set equal to the nine- month 
loan rate. The lower price for 1982, however, leads to higher 
deficiency payments of $97 million. The higher deficiency payment is 
again off set by declines of $258 million in the other loan categories to 
yield a decrease in total net out l ays of $161 million. 
Both scenarios l and 2 indicate that reserve loan rates are 
important in determining the quantity of reserve placements. 
Scenario 3: 5 Percent Yield Reduction in 1981 and 1982 
One of the reasons reserve stocks began swelling in 1981 and 
especially 1982 was because of t he good harvests during those years. In 
this scenar io, we examine the effects of lowering the yield by 5 percent 
per acre for 1981 and 1982. Yield in 1981 was lowered from 109.9 
bushels per acre to 104 bushels per acre and in 1982 from 114.5 to 108.8 
bushels per acre. 
The lower production levels cause price to rise by $. 14 in 1981 a nd 
by $.36 in 1982. Placements int o the reserve and total loans decline 
for both years . Carryover under loan increases in 1981 then decreases 
in 1982. The dther demand components, food use, feed use, and export 
demand respond t o the higher market prices by declining only slightly. 
The market price ends up being above the target price in 1982, hence, 
producers receive no deficiency payments loa~ program outlays decline 
substantially by $888 million in 1981 and $701 million in 1982. 
Note that the other demand com ponents, particularly exports, do not 
change very much. Their consistency and stability indicate that the 
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government's stock programs help keep the United States as a reliable 
supplier of co r n to importing countries. Supply shocks are absorbed by 
the stock pr ograms instead of being drastically transmitted through to 
these other demand components. 
It appears the good harvests were largely r esponsible for the 
reserve stock accumulation and large program o utlays in 1981 and 1982 . 
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY 
The general concern of this study was to examine the relationships 
that exist between the stock categories and how these relationships 
affect the cost and effectiveness of the government's subsidized storage 
programs. The specific objective was to endogenize models of the 
government's loan programs into a U.S. corn supply and demand model. In 
so doing, direct loan policy analysis is possible. Also, other types of 
analyses, like altering yield, permit the effects on the programs and 
costs to be directly examined. Chapter 5 presented examples of these 
kinds of analyses. Those results indicate that price and stock levels 
are fairly responsive to changes in the reserve loan rate and yield 
levels. 
The general model used in this study was specified similarly to the 
U.S. corn model developed by Baumes and Meyers (1980). The major 
difference was the specification of the ending stock equation. The 
stock equation in this model was designed to separate the stock 
categories that are subsidized by the government from the privately 
owned stocks. In so doing, carryover under nine-month loan became one 
of the regressors in the stock equation. By following the method of 
Miller, Meyers, and Lancaster (1978), a total loan demand equation was 
developed to include the reserve loan rate. This equation along with a 
behavioral equation for nine-month loan redemptions, permitted the 
carryover under nine-month loan category to be an endogenous variable in 
the stock equation. To make the reserve loan program endogenous, the 
coefficients for the placement equation had to be calculated from 
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simulation runs of a mon thly reserve placement model developed by 
Meyers, Jolly, and Smyth (1983a,b). The r esults pr ovided proxies for 
the annual coe fficients and yielded price elas ticities based on annual 
placements that ranged from -1.74 in 1982 /83 t o -4.8 i n 1981/82. The 
differing participation rates i n the program was a major reason for the 
spread in the elasticities. 
The remaining coefficients in the model we re estimated using 
nonlinear two-stage least squares with principal components. The 
overall estimation results were satisfactory and generally consistent 
with results from other studies. The model was validated through the 
use of a historical simulation and was found t o track the actual data 
well for most of the endogenous variables. The model converged to 
equilibrium after it was shocked for the stability check. 
The simulations in Chapter 5 covered three scenarios. Tha first 
two examined the effects of changing the reserve l oan rate a nd release 
price. The third scenario looked at what would have happened i f t he 
yields in 1981 and 1982 had been 5 percent less. 
The results of the estimation and simula tions yield the following 
conclusions about the s t orage programs and the reserve in particular. 
1) The price elasticities obtained fo r reserve placements a re 
larger than the price elasticities for the othe r demand component s . 
Other s tudies of the reserve have a lso y ielded large price 
e lasticities -- even larger than obtained here. 
2) The r eser ve pr ogr am ap pear s t o stabilize pr i ce and make t o t al 
stocks mo r e respons i ve t o pr oduct i on short falls as shown in Table 6. 1 
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below. 
Table 6.1. Change in price and total stocks per 100 mi llion bushel 
change in production 
Year Price Change Total Stock Change 
1976 (no reserve) $.08 39 million bushels 
1981 (with reserve) $ . 04 76 million bushels 
The data in Table 6.1 were computed from the results listed in Tables 
4.7 and 5.3. In 1976, when there was no reserve program, the change in 
price per 100 million bushel change in production was $.08. In 1981, 
when the reserve program was in existence, the price change was only 
$.04, or half of the 1976 price change. The change in total stocks mo r e 
than doubled from 39 million bushels in 1976 to 76 million bushels per 
100 million bushel change in production in 1981. These results indicat e 
that the reserve acts as an additional buffer against production 
changes to maintain a more stable price. 
3) Government and subsidized stocks do displace private stocks . 
The coefficient of -.25 for reserve plus CCC stocks in the ending stock 
equation indicates that private stocks decline by one-fourth bushel for 
every bushel put in the reserve. For increases in the carryover under 
nin~month loan, the ending stocks not under loan decline by just over 
half a bushel fo r each bushel under loan. · 
4) The subsidized storage programs keep the other demand 
components more stable during production shortfalls. The U. S. benefits 
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because it helps maintain our status as a r eliable supplier of grain for 
export. Livestock producers also benefit, as their price and supply of 
feed is more stable. 
5) The additional subsidy that reserve participants receive in the 
form of higher loan rates appears to be important in determining the 
quantity of grain placed into the reserve. Scenarios 1 and 2 
illustrated how placements responded to loan rate changes. 
6) In 1981 and 1982, the high yields appear to be a significant 
cause of the large buildup in reserve stocks and the high loan outlays 
that resulted. The good harvests may have been more significant than 
the high participation incentives offered by the program. 
There are, no doubt, improvements that can be made to this model. 
The fact that the reserve program was endogenous only for three years 
placed some restrictions on the simulation analysis. This model would 
be enhanced if annual equations for both cumulative placements and 
cumulative redemptions could be developed. The difficulty, however, 
lies in the limited number of observations that are available, 
especially for redemptions . 
Another enhancing possibility would be to link the participation 
rate in the rese rve program to acreage r esponse equation. The acreage 
response equation does not contain a participation rate variable, which 
is in the l oan program equations. If this link were made , analyses 
could be done to compare supply side programs with demand side programs 
via the subsidized storage programs. 
88 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Baumes, Har r y S ., Jr. , and William H. Meyers . "The Crops Model: 
Structural Equations , Definitions, and Selected Impact Multipliers." 
NED Staff Report. USDA , ESCS, Washington D.C., March 1980. 
Baumes, Harry s., Jr., and Abner w. Womack. "The Demand Structure of 
Field Crops and Policy Implications." Paper presented at Sout he rn 
Agricultural Economics Association Meetings, Hot Springs, Arkansas , 
Feb. 1980. 
Brennan , Michael J. "The Supply of Storage." The American Economic 
Review 48 (March 1958):50-72. 
Burnstein, Harlan . "'An Evaluation of the U.S. Reserves Management 
Program." NED Working Paper. USDA, ESCS, Washington , D.C. , Dec . 
1980. 
Burnstein, Harlan. "Total price s upport l oans and year end priva t e 
government stocks of corn 1965/66-80/81." Typewrittep data. NED, 
ESCS, Washington, D.C., 1982. 
Chambers, Robert G. , and William E. Foster. "Par ticipation in the 
Farmer-Owned Reserve Program: A Discrete Choice Model . " American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 65 (Feb. 1983):120-124. 
Golden, Michael, and Leonard Burman. "An Econometric Model of Farmers' 
Demand for Commodity Credit Corporation Loans." Southern Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 12 (Dec. 1979):47-55. 
Huyser, Wipada s. " A regional analysis of trade policies affecting the 
soybean and soymeal market." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation . Iowa 
State University , Ames, Iowa, 1983. 
Langley , James. "Reserve Loan Activity." Typewritten dat a . Food and 
Agricultural Policy Branch, NED , ERS, Washington, D.C., 1984a. 
Langley, James . "U .S. Ending Stocks, 1950-1983." Typewritten data. 
Food and Agricultural Policy Branch, NED , ERS , 1984b. 
Martin, Marshall A. "The Agriculture and Food Ac t of 1981 : Implications 
for Indiana Farmers." Purdue Farm Management Report. Cooperative 
Extension Service, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, Feb. 
1982. 
Meyers, William H., and Rober t W. Jol l y . "Price Implicat i ons of 
Farme rs' Response t o t he Farmer-Owned Reserve Program." Presen ted 
a t Amer i can Agricul tural Economics Associa t ion Mee tings , Ur bana , 
Illinois , Jul y 1980. 
89 
Meyers, William H., Robert w. Jolly,, and D. Craig Smyth. "Forecasting 
Farmers' Response to the Farmer- Owned Reserve Program." Presented 
at the Applied Commodity Analysis and Forecasting Conference, I owa 
State University, April 1983. 
Meyers, William H., Robert w. Jolly, and D. Craig Smyth . "On Estimating 
Parameters for Farmer-Owned Reserves." NC-169 Regional Workshop. 
West Lafayette, Indiana, August 1983. 
Meyers, William H., and D. Craig Smyth. "An Evaluation of Corn Reserve 
Placements: The Impacts of Program Provisions and Mar ket 
Conditions." Presented at AAEA Meetings, Cornell University, Aug. 
1984. 
Miller, Ronald R., William H. Meyers, and Michael A. Lancaster. 
"Farmers' Response to the Commodity Credit Corporation's Loan 
Program." Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 11 (Dec. 
1978):157-164. 
Morton , Andrew Scott. "Potential price variability in the U.S. grain and 
livestock sector in the 1980s under alternative policy scenarios: 
An econometric approach." Unpublished Ph.D . Dissertation . Iowa 
State Unive rsity, Ames, Iowa, 1982. 
Peck, Anne E. "Implications of Private Storage of Gr ains for Buffer 
Stock Schemes to Stabilize Prices," Food Research Institute Studies 
15, No. 3 (1977):125-140. 
Pindyck, R., and D. Rubinfeld. Econometric Models and Economic 
Forecasts. Second ed. New York, McGraw-Hill,---r9"81. 
SAS. SAS/ETS User's Guide. SAS Institute, Inc., ~ary, North Carolina, 
1982. 
Sharples, Jerry A., and Forrest D. Rolland. "Impact of the Far mer-Owned 
Reserve on Privately Owned Wheat Stocks." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 63 (August 1981):538-543. 
Spitze , R. G. F., and Marshall A. Hartin. Analysis _£!. Food and 
Agricultural Policies for the Eighties. North Central Regional 
Research Publication, No. 271 , Illinois Bulletin 764. University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Nov . 1980. 
USDA. Agricultural Statistics. Various issues. United States 
Government Printing Office , Washington, D.C. 
USDA. "USDA Reports Price Support Loan Activity ." Various issues . 
ASCS, Washington, D.C . 
90 
Westhoff, Patrick, and William H. Meye r s . "Alternative Single Equation 
Models of World Export Demand for Corn , Soybeans , Soymeal, Wheat , and 
Soyoil." Unpublished paper. Economics Dept . , Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa, June 1984 . 
91 
APPENDIX A. REDUCED FORM DERIVATIONS 
Reduced form for Pt (Equation 2 . 6) : Substitute (2 . 3) , (2 . 4) into (2 . 2), 
then substitute (2 . 1) , (2.2) , (2 . 3) into (2 . 5) and solve for Pt . 
(A . l) 
where 
p = t 
a1 + a 2 + a3(1- d2 ) - e2a4 + (c2- l)QPt + c 3(1- d2 )zt + (l- f 2)CCCt 
b1 + b2 + e2b4 + b3( l-d2) 
(STKt -1 + Rt- 1 + ccct- 1) 
b1 + b2 + e2b4 + b3(l- d2) 
a 0 = a 1 + a2 + a 3 (1- d2 ) - e 2a 4 
a 1 = c2 - 1 
a 2 = c3(l- d2) 
a 3 = l - f2 
Yo "' STKt-1 + Rt- 1 + ccct- 1 
s = bl + b2 + e2b4 + b3(l- d2) 
a < o 1 
a > o 2 
a. 3 > 0 
y 0 > 0 
f3 > 0 
Reduced form for Rt (Equation 2. 7): Substitute (2.6) into (2 . 3) . 
Reduced for m for QPt+l (Equation 2. 9): Substitute (2 . 6) into (2 . 4) . 
Reduced form for STKt (Equation 2. 8): Substitute (2 . 6) , (2 . 7) , (2 . 9) into 
(2 . 2) . 
+[O:al (b2 + e2b4 - d2b3) + c2] QP, 
-[ :2 (b2 + •2b4 - d2b3) + d2c3] Z, 
.92 
- [ ClSJ (bz + e2b4 - d2b3 )+ fJccc, +~ (bz + ezb4 - dzb3 ] Yo 
a.o 
where AO = a2 - d2a3 - e2a4 + -S-(d2b3 - b2) +e2b4a.0 in (2 . 8) . 
1 - - - -
b1 + b3 
1 - - - ------- --
b1 + b2 + e 2b4 + b3(1- d2) 
> 0 
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APPENDIX B. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Endogenous variables: 
CORDF : Corn feed demand, million bushels. 
CORDH: Corn food demand, million bushels. 
CORHT : Corn, total ending stocks, mil lion bushels 
CORECPC: Corn, pr opor tion of world exports to EEC, million bushels. 
CORHCCl : Corn, ending commercial stocks less carryover under l oan , 
million bushels . 
CORHPRRE: Corn, ending farmer-owned reserve stocks , million bushels. 
CORMX: Corn, t ot a l U. S. exports , million bushels. 
CORNRE: Ne t returns from corn, $/acre. 
CORNTRED: Corn, nine-month loan r edemptions , million bushels. 
CORPF : Corn price r ecei ved by farmers, $/bushel. 
CORPGRl: Corn, production for next year, million bushels . 
CORPRES : Corn, net c rop year placements in the reserve, million bushels. 
CORSA: Corn a creage planted , million acres. 
CORSAl : Corn, expected acreage planted, mil l ion acres. 
CORSOYEU: Weighted corn/soymeal price r a t io of EEC threshold and U. S. 
market price, $/bushel. 
CORTPSL: Corn, t otal price support loans , million bushels. 
CORXTOT: Corn, world export demand , million bushels. 
CPLACE: Corn, cumulative reserve placements, million bushels. 
CPRATW: Weighted price ratio, government loan r ate/mar ket price of corn . 
CRISK: Corn, risk variable . 
DEFPAY: Corn , deficiency payment when market price is below target 
price, $ . 
FORLOAN: Farmer-owned reserve loan out l ays, $. 
FORRED: Value of reserve loan r edemptions, $. 
NETCOST: Net outlays fo r the loan pr ograms , $. 
NETFOR: Net reserve l oan outlays , $ . 
NETNM: Net nine-month l oan outlays , $. 
NMLOAN : Nine-month loan outlays , $. 
NRL : Corn, carryover under nine- month loan, million bushels. 
TSPMT: Total reserve and CCC stock storage costs, $ . 
Z: Pr oportion of to t al loans placed under nine-month loan . 
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Exogenous variables: 
CENl : Personal consumption expenditures , nondurable goods and services , 
billion $ . 
CORDS : Corn, seed demand, million bushels. 
COREXTL: Corn placed under extended l oan during c rop year, million 
bushels. 
CORFCCC: Corn, nine- month loans forfeited to CCC , million bushels . 
CORHHUN: Corn , ending CCC (uncommi tted) stocks, million bushels . 
CORMESR: Corn, Soviet Union net imports from non- U. S . sources , 1000 
metric tons. 
CORMG : Corn, total U.S. PL480 and AID exports, million bushels . 
CORMI: Co r n, total U. S. imports, million bushels. 
CORt1XCC: Corn, exports of South Africa, Argentina, Thailand , 1000 metric 
tons. 
CORMXSPR: Corn , total U. S. exports to Soviet Union and PRC, million 
bushels. 
CORPA : EEC threshold price , UOA/MT. 
CORPDl: Corn, effective diversion payment, $/ bushel . 
CORPEl: Corn , expected effective price support, $/bushel . 
CORPL: Corn, nine-month loan rate, $/bushel . 
CORPT : Corn, target price, $/bushel . 
CORRE: Corn, reserve loan rate, $/bushel. 
CORSYGRl : Corn, yield fo r next year, bushel/acre. 
CORVC: Corn, variable cost of production, $/acre . 
COR9SRF : Available supply of corn for feed in EEC and rice feed in 
Japan, 1000 metric tons. 
COSHNEA: World exports to EEC, million bushels. 
CPART: Program part icipation rate , %. 
CUMFOR: Corn , cumulative reserve for feitures, million bushels . 
CUMRED : Corn, cumulative reserve redemptions, million bushels. 
CYRED: Cor n, c r op year reserve loan r edemptions , mill ion bushels. 
EXTCARRY: Corn ca rried over under extended loan , million bushels. 
FPINDEX: Farm price index, 1967 = 1. 
GCAUTST: Grain consuming animal units, cal . year . 
ICCC: CCC interest rate on loans, %. 
IPCA: PCA interest rate on loans, %. 
LIVIFl: Livestock price index, 1953-57 farm prices, 1966 = 1. 
LIVPEUJl : Index of EEC Japanese poultry and hog production, 1967 1. 
PRES: Corn , r eserve release price , $/bushel . 
RSHIFT : Dummy variable, 1 f or 1977-1982, otherwise 0 . 
SDROCT: U. S . dollar s per SOR, Oc tober basis , $/SDR . 
SHIFT72: Dummy variable, l for years prior to 1973 , otherwise O. 
SHIFT79: Dummy variable, 1 for 1979 and 1980 , otherwise O. 
SNREl: Soybeans, net returns per acre , $/acre . 
SOHPM : Soybean price received by farmers , $/bushel. 
SPt-IT : Stor age payment, $/bushel. 
TBILL: Three-year treasury bill rate , %. 
WAIVE81: Dummy variable, 1 for 1981 , otherwise O. 
WHEIWl: Wholesale price index, 1967 = l. 
WHEPF: Wheat , ave rage price r eceived by farmers , J - J, $/ bushel . 
